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Tnc queEtion cT bof taxec on ccrpor&tt iirtritoutionf Lffec'v economic
bcharior if cer.trfc.1 to rvuluatinp t nurber cf nclcr rax refcm options.
cw-'-TK tovcrds eltner consurrr.tior, taxctior. cr corrc^rEte tax ir.ierrz.tior. v'c.»ld
resii-l* in cramiitic reductions in tnp taxcE ieviec on divioend income. On the
other hand, novement toverdE a coirprehennive incone tax vould raise the effec-
tive tax burden on dlvidendB. While nanj' Tinancial econoaintB have studied
"the question ol" vny TLtidb pay filvidendE despite the associated tax penalties
inposed on nanj' investors, no consenEUB has emerged as to the cffectE of divi-
dend taxation on rirms ' invectBcnt and financial Decisions.
This paper BuaanarizeB our research prosraa examining the enpirical
vaJLidlty cC several videlj' held views about the econordc cffectE cf dividend
"taxation. Ern;irical analvsis cf dividend taxation using Affierican data is dif-
ficult., "Decause there has been relatively little variation over tine in the
.; relevant lejialation. Ve •therefore focus on espirical analysis of t,he British
:' esperience since 1P5D, viiich has been characterized ty four major refcnnE in
=•"":-:
-the taxation of ccrporate distributions. These refcrns have generated
Eubst^antial variation in "the effective •m'^^rtp'] -zux rate on dividend income,
and provide an ideal na"cural experiment for stucving "the econcric effects cf
dividend "taxes.
At "the cutset, it is i=pcrtast to clarify vny developing a cor—
.
Tinning aodel cf the effects cf fivinend "taxation has "oeen so difficult for
• cconoriEtB. Etraigitfcrward anal^'sis suggests that since some EhareholderE
are "tax penalized vhen firms pay dividends instead cf retaining earnings,
firns should not pay divinends. I>i"rinend 'xaxes should collect no revenue and
.
isrpose no aZJLocative distcrtions. Sven the most casual es^iricism discredits
tliis analysis. The payment cf dividends is a common and enduring practice cf
cost lerre ccrpcrations, and It n-ppcLTs to result ir. Eubstar.tii.2 tax liatili-
ties for a^ny inventors. It. roncllir.f tne cr'ectr cf d:viacnd taxes. It If
^herefcre necesscrj' to provide some a::count of vny iiviaenos ere paid. Gnven
the Elrrple model's clear no-dlvidend prediction, anj' model vhich rationc^lzcE
dlridend payout vlll Been at least partly' xinBatiEfactory. However, Eome
choice iB clearly necesBtry if ve are to make any headway towards
undcrBtanilng the econoaic cffectE of dividend taxes.
Ve consider three cospcting vievE of hov dividend taxes affect declEionB
fej' firns and Ehareholdcr&. Tnry are not iii:tually excluEive, and each could be
relevant to the "Dehai-lor cf Bome firms. Tne first \'iev, vhich ve label the
"tax irrelevance I'lev," argues that contrary to naive expectations, dividend
paying firms are not penalized in the Bcriretplace.^ It holds that in the
Ijsited States, because of various nuances in the tax code, marginal investors
do not require extra pretax returns "to induce tbem to hold diviQen6-pE;,-ing
securities. Seme personal investcrs are effectively untaxed on divinend
income.. Dther investors, viio face high transactions coses cr ar>e n3r>-taxa'ble
"but fE.ce Itr.i tations on ejrpenditures fror capital, find dividends acre attrac-
tive "than capital gains fcr noif-tax reasons. These iirvestcrs demand dividenD-
psyiag securities. If this viev is cc?~ect and divicenD-paying firms are not
penalized, then 'there is no divinend puctle. Kcreover, changes in dividend
tax rates
_ or dividend policies should affect neither the total value of enj'
firin nor its investment neciEions, Divinend taxes are therefore nondistcr-
•^Killer and Scholes (19TB, ip52) are the principal exponents cf
:hiE viev.
•^*onE.r%'. ^''c "^^^ irrelrvance virv irx-licF tnE-t rcauiinf iivioend ^axer vould
have no cfle"*- on zhz.r^ vuIucl, ccrprrcte invertricr.t cjeciricnc, cr tne
A Bccond view repariing tne dividend payout problcc, vhich also
bolds that rllvidcnd taxcE do not have diEtortionery cffectE, nay be ctLlled the
"tax capitalization i^-pothcEiB."^ The prcnise of this iricv is that the only
vay for mature fimiE to pass money through the corporate veil is fey paying
• taxaLle dlvidendB. The market vulue of corporate asBctE Ie therefore cquiil to
the present value of the after-tax dividendE vhich Tirms are expected to pay.
Moreover, because these future taxes are capitalized into chare values, shart—
holders are indifferent "t>etveen pclicies of retaining earnings or paying
diTidends. On this viev, raising dividend taxes vould result in an immediate
decline ia the market value cf CDrporate enuitj'. However, dividend taxes have
:;r ao iapact. on a rirr's marginal incentive to invest. They are esBestially luisp
SUE taxes levied on the initial holders o' corporate capital, vith no distor-
tionary cTfectE on real decisions. Tne tax capitElination viev implies that
reducing dividend taxes vould confer vindlall gains en ccrpcrate shareovners,
vi"thcrjt altering corporate investment incentives.
A third, and mere traditional, viev cf dividend taxes treats then as
additional taxes ta comcrate rrcrits.S Destite the heavier tax ^.irden on
^Althou^ this vice is linked vith the long-standing notion of ^
'trapped" ecuity in the comcrate sector, it has "ueen formalized "cy Auerbach
(1979 )» Bradford (I9B1), end Eing (1977).
.
-This is the irslicit viev of many proponents of tax integration;
see, for exanple, hicClure (1977). '
iividenas^ tnar. or. cc-ixt.! ci^ms,, firnr ere rrvEroed fcr nBvmp iiviaenas. Tne
explanc-.ior, Icr this rfvjird iF i:r.:.ler.r; it rLifrr.t invcOvt mnarerit.: nipn:.llinc
or other factcrB. Tne presence cf this rrwnrd irr_lies tnat in rpire cf their
BbareholQcrE ' iiipher tax liability, fimiE can be indifferent to ina.rpinal chanpes
in their ilviQcnd paymentB. This view sugpeEtB that the relevant tax burden for
rims considerinE marginal inveEtmcntB iE the total t^x levied on invcEtment
returnB at both the corporate and the personal level. Dividend tax rrductlonB
both raise share vulues and provide incer.tivcE for capital inventmerit , because
they lower the prtr-tax return vhich finnE are required to cam. Dividend tax
changes vould therefore affect the econosic'E long run capital iritenslty.
Dur espirical vorl: is directed at evaluating each of these three
vievE cf iiviDend taxation. Tne results Euggest that the "traditional" view
of dividend taxation is aost consistent vith Sritish post-var data on security
returns, payout ratios, end investment decisions. Vt.'. 1 e the efferts cf dividend
-axes need not be parF.', ' el in the t'nited St.atcE and -the United Hingdos^ cur
results are strcnjly suggestive for the United Etaxes.
Tne tiaa of tne paper is as fcHows. Section I lays out the three
alternative vievs cf dividend taxation in greater detail, and discusses their
trr.''' rrticns for the relationship "oetveen dividend taxes and corporate invest—
Eent and dividend decisions. Section 11 describes the nature and evclution of
the British tax system in soae detail. The ''natural erperissEnts" provided tiy
post-irar British tax refcnas provide the basis for cur subsenuent espirical
tests. Section 111 presents^ evidence on hov "tax changes cflect investors
'
relative vtluaticn^ of • dividends and capital painE br focusing on ex-divinend
,
_„ ^-- ».p iirivener.t.B it. tne L'r.lxeS Mmrcor-. Oi:r resultr edov- tna* tax rates
-.^^»c- tn '-riuence tne vuiue cf diviaend mccDine. Sectior. TV extendi this
nalvEis tj' exanining chare price cnanpes In mor.ths vnen ilviaend tax re forms
vere announced, presentino further eviaence that tax rates affect Becurlty
valuation. Tests of the alternative theories ' lEtlications for the effects of
dividend tax changes on corporate payout policies are presented in Section V.
Ve find tnat dlriQcnd tax changes do affect the chare of profits vhich flms
choose XD distribute. Section ^1 Iocubce directly on investment decisionE,
testins viiicb "^'iev of diTi'idend taxation best explains the time Bcries pattern
of British investment. Finally-, in Section 'II ve discuss the irplications of
oar results for tax policy' and suggest several directions for ftrture
research.
The irrelrvance cf iiviaend pcliry in l taxlesE vorld nas hrcn
recornized since Hillcr and Modifllanl'E IlQ^l) pathtrea^iine vori;. If chart—
holderE face differential tax ratcB on dividends and capital pains, however,
then the Irrelevance result nay no longer hold. Dividend policy nay affect
Eharebolder wealth, and EhareholderE nsy not be cinultaneouEl^' Iniiflercnt
to inveEtmentB financed from retained eamlngE and inventner.tE financed
from nev equity issueB.
To ULluEtrate these proponltions, ve conEidcr the arter-tax return
viiicb £ shareholder vlth asiir^inal tax rates cf je and z on dividends and capi-
i;al gains, respectively, receives trj' holding shares in a particular firii.^
mbe Eharebolder ' E after-tax return P, is
(1.1) p^^ = !:-r:~^+ (i-t)(—= -)
vhere D^ is the firr's dividend pavserrt, T_^ is the total vf.'me cf the fire
D
2.2 period t, esc T^_^^ is the period t-<-l 'value cf the Eaares outstanding in
period t., !I'o fcms 02 ts^;-rel£.ted aspects cf the firr's prchler., ve shsl^
ignore uncert.f
i
nry , treating » ^_. as rnism st ti=£ t.^ Tne total -value cf the
firm at t-rl is
^;ihe tax rate r is the marginal effective tax rate on capital '-
pains, Es defined by ^ing (1977). Since gains are tiaxefi on realisation, not
accrual, z is the expected vsiue cf the xax liability vhicb is induced "en- a
capital gain accruing today.
''A closely related model vhicb incorporates uncertairrj"- and invest-
ment ad^uEtment costs is solved in rozerha and Eunmiers (I9B3).
'here V eoualE nev EhurcE isEued in period *-. Equation (1.1 ) can be revrltxer.,
assusing that in egullibrium the Ehareholricr eamE his required return so P »= p, aB
it
(^ 3) pV - (n-E)D^ - (l-t)vj." + (l-t)(V - Vj.^"-^' t t t t+1 t
Eouation (1.3) inplies the iirfcrence equation for the viilue of the firm, V ;
It Jnay he solved forward, Eu"b;\ect to the transversalitj- condition
(1.5) lia (1 ^r^)'-V^ = D
to obtain an expression for the veJLuc of the fim:
,^=D "* •"!!• .:!'''
!I!"ae total "rc^jue cf the firr Ie the presest disocurrted Talue cf after-tax diTi-
neaoE, less the present "vtZLue cf nev share issues viiich currett Ehareholders
vctid De required to purchase in cruer tc rE^rrtaii: their r'\r'-^ cs a coustarrt
fraction cf the firr's total diTidenus and profits.
Before turniag to consider "the dirferent Tierws cf diTidend taxation,
ve snail sketch the firnTs cptisization pro'blcs^ The firr's obj^ective is
to aaxisiize its sarzet "VEiue, subject to several constraints.^ The first is
^In EH uncertain enrironiaent , strong conditions on the set cf
ETaila"ble securities are reouired to ensure naricet value naxirization.
its cash nov
ioentlty:
(l.T) (-^)\-'t^^^ H
here ^ is pretax proflxatillty , I Ie ^dbe invectment erpenilture, and t
iB the corporate tax rate.
H^ = \^^V^' vhere Y. is the capital ctoch at the
becinning of period t."^ Next, there Ie an equation QeBcrltinf; the evolution of
the rinn'E capital Etocl::
:
'
^^-B)
^'t " ^t.1 * \-
We assume "that there is no Depreciation, and igmore ad^lustment costs cr the
possi'ble irreversitilixj' of investment. Finally, there are restrictions
on the fin's financial pclicies: diridendE cannot be negative,
—^ R
- and nes- share issues must be greater than some rinimal level V ,'^
: i-"^-'--;" reflecting restrictions on the firr's ahilitj' to repurchase shares cr to engage
.-""
' in transact
-W?.^:j:A-/ "be vritten
^^. (1.9) H^ > .
rK-'ifr— ana
^&(i:iDK ^>^ '. . . '
y^_fi:--[ >.— ., t . ' ' • •
l^r
.'i^' Vhere "T < Dv . -
'•a^i^^^^^^r"- • Before formally solTing for the fin's investment and financial
^w^,"^:;:. .
.^t^SJ.""-'.- ' '"^^ consider the firr's problem in discrete time to avoid the dif-
;3-- 7 -^^"^ies of infinite investment over short time inti
'0yi in a coctinuou&-time model vithout adjustment costs.
5£-^'^'"-. - * ^ ervals vhich vould result
,„ii-i};-"/ °Share repurchELses are Tjossible to some extent in the United
w*.fc..,ss» nDfvever. ^remlLaT T-o-n-'^-Vio*r-^^'~ ^r>-. -, ^-^ — - —^.-^ —. .
— nn^crve one irrucr^&r.t lecti:re cf etti- sslutior ^D thir proLlen.. Tneplan, ve dds j
^..-ir^ never sin^^anecjuslv issue npv equity and pay cl:viQena&. If a firm
both D > D and V
'
> V in an:' period, then there vould exist a feasible
rturbation in financial policy' vhich vould not affect investment or prcflXE
in any period but vould raise share values. This perturbation involves a
reduction in (iividentiE, conpensated for bj' a reduction in nev share iBsues.
^oL ...-: To vaiy diridends and nev share isEues vithout affecting H or I , ve require
^•fe:": (1.11 ) sv^ = SD^.
-J r^'-': jYom ecuation (l-S), the change in share TEJLue caused tr;' a dividend change in
• ',
' period t-^J vhich satisfied (l.ll) is
"* r: ;,»:_
:(i.i2)
.
"
ay, . l^fffK^j - <j)'i - :^'-' ' -
-felH'j'- * zh^"-
^^^v If in exceeds z, reducing diridends vaenever feasihle vill TEi.se T__
.
',.-*"r-"' ;,-/-';- Eince this perr-urbation arsrjs^rt epplies at bt:^- positive level cf
""^'"r diTideads, it esxaclisbes tbat firss vith sufficient prcfics to cover invest-.
"?~?*^J. inerrt needs should reduce nev snare issues and rerrurcnase snares to the er^est
'"irTi* possible. For scase firrs, I zsj exceed 'j--t)r^, end "there vill "oe nev share
l^^j issues.: 2ven if a > z, therefore , soaie nev ecui"ry asy be issued. Eisilarly,
'^jj^- Boae rims asy have too fev investments to fully -Jtilise their current tro-
1 ::-• i'its.'- - If feasible,' these fims should rerjurchase their shares. Daly after
^
_^
ifej vr-- y:j:^.
;he rep-jrchase as a dividend.. In Britain, vhere share repurchase is explicitly
-''"--,-
"h&nned, these questions do not arise. The situation is ocre ccrplex vhen trar—
: sactions equivalent to share repurchase, such as direct pcrtfclio investments,
^2:;v^_tre- considered.
w «---rr iB.y~irce distriDUtior. channelE Ehoulif tnesf rirms -pay iiviaends.
''n:, hovever, Enould rver oprrare or. r-th
tne Izviaend and rnare issue
cins EicLiltaneouEly. The "iividend p-jzi.le" conciEts of tne
observation
that Eome firms pay dividendE vhlle eJLsd having unused opportur.ltieE to
repurchase EharcB or engage in equivalent transactionE vhich vould effectively
-ransEiit tax-free income to chareholdcrE. Edwards [iQ^h ) reportE that in a
Basple of large British firms, over 25 percent paid tHridenoE and issued nev
eouiTJ' in *nc ^^^^ year, vtiile 17 percent not only pr^id but rajyied their di't'l-
dends curing years vhen thej' isEued ncv Ehares.
.•
:._ .. The conclusions described above apply vhen there is or-ly one share-
-'-"^i^il iiolder and his tax rates saticfj' m > i. However, the actual econonc' is
r^^lS^^ characterized ty SEj^y different shareholderE, cften vi-th videly different tax
$.,r^:;Hf:^. rates. "Wiiile ri nay exceed z for some EhareholderE, there are many investcrB
;ii3^' lor V2.am a = i and still ethers facing hi^iier t-ax rates on catii-al gains t.han
-®-:^:f -^= on diTidends.- If there were no shcrt selling constraints, "then as irsnnan
^1- (1570) and tJcrdon and Bradford (ipBO) shov, -there vnuld "oe a unique sarset-vide
"^'^i^^'- preference far diTidends in teras cf capital gains. It vsuld ecual a veigirted
'^^^i^!^ average of different irrvestcr's tax rates, vith hijier veigins =n vealttier,
'^;X':^.fi sjni iess rist averse, investors. If there are constraints, however, then dif-
^$T-/-—^cs^ firms SEy face different investor clienteles, possibly characterized try
• ^^^^:''-
-
.fi-f^erent tax rates. If some traders face lov transactions costs (Miller and
T^^^i.^^^"^^^ (I9B2), Zalay (19E2)) and are nearly risl: neutral,, then they may effec-
-'--^"S;;^;";V*'"^''^^. netersine the maricet'E relative valuation of dirinenas and capital
;,-j _,i*;.v»^^j_,^..^ .;
-">^v.vjfe^ ' "' ' ^BE principal class cf American investors for vhom a is less than
..'-..;. 2 is ccrporate holders cf coszcon stocii, vho may exclude B5 percent of their
^"^^^^'2 income froir. their taxable income, there'trj' facing a tax rate of -15 x
painE End beconie the ncrpinal investcrt.
The fim: chooBCE Z^ , "^J, I'^ , end T xo naxiniize V Eub.^ect to
M '') (l.B), (1.9) E-nd (l.lO). The firc'E proLler; may be revrltten as
(1.13) .-X i (1 . ::^)-" I Ki^to, - <i - »,Ik^ - r.^, - :J
t«=0
- p I(:-T)ii(}:J * vf - D - T ] - Ti (v^^ -Y^'') - c r 1
vbere 5^ . ^ » \ » ^"'^ ^ ^'^ *^^ Lagrange ciiltiplierE asEociated vlth the
t t K t
ccjuEtrairitE. Tne first order neccBsary condlticsnE for an optinaJ program are:
(1.15) '^.: "K ^ tl -^r^r^^, - Vj:-T)ll'(rj =
(l.lfi) vf: -1 . v^ _ -n^ i: D t^^(tJ-Y^) < D
(I.IT) !>.: (^) + 1^^ - ^^ «= D S_D^ < 0.
-''%- ^ interpreting these coniiticas under the diffei-ent TiewE cf diriaend taxt-
S^-iM^
tics., ve -can isolaxe the isplications of each for the eTfectE cf ciTinenfl
-f'^-;"-^'^. . taxEtion on tiie cost cf capital, investasnt, ps^cut pilicj, and seciritj
-'.^vlj:' l.A*L !!rne Tar Irrelevance Tjev
The first "riew of iiTidend taxation x'^ch ve consider esEuaeB that
'i^^^^ share prices are set ty investors for TOOin ie = n. "We label this "the ^ax
^'y^^i't;.-" :-: ;--'-
gazjis.
1 vance" viev; .It va- anvance-
^- Miller ar.d EcholcB (I^TE, 1QS2). Miller
^ ^ i-c P-rue tnat tne marcinal investor ir. ccrprrate equities Ic efJer-
and Scholes a- e"'=
.^.fnvpt' on both dividendE and capital pcins income. -^^ Hamada and
his (19B^)» ^^^ "^^ "''^^^ "^'"^^^ ''^^ "before Tax Tneorj'," note that It
entially asEuneB "that all personal Income ^axeE - to bondholderE,
tockholderB, and partners of bucineBses - can be effectively laundered."
•;'l^-''';i-'.-
-
Several Bcenarios coiild lead "to narginal invcEtors being iintaxed on
.•: capital income. Tne ncrpinal investor nay be an institutional inventor for
'i?"^?--
'
vhom a = - = D. Alternatively', in the United EtatcE, the n2.re:inal investor
'-X^'^y^ jnay "be en indiridual investor for vhoiD dividend income relaxes the deduction
lu^i-.^k licit for interest expenses, nalting o effect ivelj- zero. Tiiis investor night,
S^tSJ"" as -a result of tay-niniciring transactions such as holding shares vith
j.-T'.''.'.- "-?>".._. _
^"*5f-;^~-' gains and selling shares vith losses, also face a sero tax rate on capital
>—
- gains.—
^
feSS--^"^ii^^^-tv r.-ni,-..
^^-r •-— IThe intemretation af first order conditions (l-li;)-(l.l7) in :ne
Sii5i-^3^5:" r5=r=D case is rtraigitfcrvE^d. !rne last tvo constraint conditions Ei=n:lify
' MZ'^^"^ Euastastially. As long as the firr is either paying diridends or issuing
shares, one cf ''^^ or ^^, the shadov TeJliies cf the T^ end Tl ccnnrairxs, vill
^.|^ ;.^/^; ecufil zero, using either (l.l£) or (l.lT), sii- r « r « 0, this ir^JLies thst
^vt-'.?S?^-' V7"".« --1." The shareholder Talues one ncllar cf additional nrcfitE et ^ust one
.'--J-v:-Ss,CDollErir"'- IThe shadcw Talue of capital, ?>_. can "ne deterzined from (l.li). Since
:;-^-^-^::'7^;'^.~->^-"-.'r:--- J-i^Ancther case in vhich'the narket voulfi exhibit an indifference
'';nr^^':;;:;-^.':,^etveen fiiTidends and capital gains is vhen the BE.rginal investor is a broker
^'>%3^"fS °^ oealer in securiticE, facing enual (but noi>-2ero) tax rates on both divi-
':^'?g*f..^ends and short temi capital gains.
;"_'\.,,;^;-v ." "'•A 'fliller IiquilibriuE" in vhich all investcrs vith a tax preference
-
.v;ft'^?S'..-^°~ diTidenas held divinenD-payi.ng shares, vhile ether held zero-di't'idend
.;^£«i-4^''l stoch, vDuld also "ne consistent vith this prediction. Ecjwever, entsirical evi-
ti c X ve can concluoe tnat >, = 1. Tne snannrv- vi^lue of one ncre unl* of
cEUlteJ in plE.ce, ^, , corresponds xo 'miirfiinal q" m the invertmcr.t literature
Pi-ms invest until the incremental Increase
in their market value froK a one
dollar investment is exactly one dollar,
regardlesE of the source of their
narginal investment funds.
The knowledge that ^ ^t4l " ^ enables us to solve equation (1.15)
for the equilibriuB marginal product of capital:
!rne I-aylor expansion of p/(l-*-p) around p = D tZJlowE us to cppro::imate the
right hand side of this expression 'by P, ^'lelding the standard result that
:•>-' (l-"r)II'(E_^) = p. "We define the cost cf capital be the value of 31' (H) v^iich
i'.-. *' *
i}": iTist satisfies (l.lB), and using the approximation find
"'" (1.19) c = t .
'•_-. ^26 fine's cost cf capital is independent cf its pavout pclicr. Changes in
;,: "the ccrpcrate tax rate vill affect investrsent decisicns. However, investaent
":- poli^ vill he indeT>ennent cf hcth the firm's diridend psvout choices and the
:-- prevailing nominal diTidend tax rate, since it is alvE^s effectively reduced
*' J
"-"- J ". .-^ .,' -
-,
,-' to zero iry tax-vise- investors. Assuring that 1!Ft=D for the marginal investor
- " leads inmediately to m-II p- and' Modigliani ' s (ip6l) irrelevance result for a
^C taxless vorld. "'•''.'->-"
dence on the extent of tax clienteles vith respect to dividend •y-xt.l& argues
against this viev.
^nt t-ax irrelrvancf virv tiso im-lies tnat tne riE^-ai^luEted
-ired return on all ccuity se::uritieE is cauul, repcLrdiesB cf tnelr d:vi-
•
nd vield. Ass\izlng that ull returns are ccrtclr., the basic capital TttxrKet
cquilitriuD condition Ie-^2
(1.20) P '
"^i
^ % ^"^ ^
vbere d 1e the dividend yield and £. the expected capital pcin on securltj' 1.
There should be no detcctaLlc d.irrerenceE in the retumE on iirfcrent Ehares
B.B a result cf Tlrn dividend pclicies.
The asEU=ption that e=t=D Tor scr^inal investcrE is ultimately
verifiable orJ:^' -rom ecpirical Etucj'. Some evidence, such as the somevhEt
controversial finding that on ex-dividend davB share prices decline by less
than the value cf their dividendE, sugpestE that the sarginal investor may not
face identical tax rates on dividends and capital gains.The second and ti^rd
vievE cf dividend taxation assune that shareE ar^ valued as if the marginal
investor faced a iiigher effective tax rate on dividends than en capital pains.
^ncr atterpt to erplain visy, in spite cf tnis tax disadvantage, dividends are
still observed. "We label the next "svo vievs the "tax capitalisation" and the
'traditional*' vicirs. Each 3-ields different predictions abcr^ nor the cost cf
capital, investment, end dividend pclicy are affected by dividend teoation.
l.B The Tar Danitalination Tjev
The 'h;ax capitalization viev" of dividend taxes vas developed by
Auerbacb (1979), Bradford (I9BI), and Sling (1977). It applies to mature firms
vhich have after-tax profits in excess cf their desired investment exuen-
-•^ne extension to the "A?W frameworl: vhicb incorporates risk is
s~^^e^tfcr«-ard and involves retlacing p vith r -••£.(----) vhere --. is the
^
_. __ ^._„„ „ c " f 1 m i f
'»'—
-res. I<e^£.ined -earr.inpf ere theref orr thp nErpinul source cf Inventment
'undE for tnese firas. T.":ie virv asBum-E tnat TirDF cannct find ^a>-!rec
J' — T'
hannels for trans ferring income to chareholaerE so that the V = V ' <
constraint tinds. Therefore, the fim pavE e taxable iivioend equal to the
exccBE of profits over investment:
(1.21) \ - (^-^)\ - \ •^~"-
UividendB are determined as a rcEidual.
The first order coniitions '.1.1^4 )- (1.17 ) can be reinterpreted for a
firm in tiiiE situation. Ve showed above that a firn vhich vas paying divi-
dends voiild repurchase shares to the naxinum extent possible, so "T = V .
FomiEJlly, the tnorvledge that D^ > D lHowe ue to set ^ . «= D in (1.17), isrolj-ing
V^ K - I(3.-ia)/(j.-i)]. -iie marginal vtiue cT a tinit cT capiXE^., *roin eaun-tion
w .
.
.
(l.li;), is therefore •
"
(1.22) \ = •:=—) < 1.
. hzT^LssZ. c is Iiess thsi one ir erui-li-brius. Firas irrvest until, investors are
^:" infirfertst ct the nargin "Dctveei: receiTlag additional dividend paysiertE and
reinvesting rsney vithin the firsi. frucn the firt psjB £• one dcHsr ciTidesd,
i- "the shareholder receives (l-a) E.fter x&x. If the firm retains "the dollar and
i purchases capital, its share value vill appreciate try o and the shareholder
,;. vill receive (1-1)5. ^ after-tax income. If the shareholder is indifferent
on the SETket.
*«-cp TVD actions, the ecuilieriur. vulue cf iBcrpint.1 c rust csualbetween -nese ^wc
l(i-E)/(:i--)J-
•"ne cost of capiteJ. under tne tax capltulization viev can be acrived
^!«r, fl '5). It vill depend on both tne cu-rent narpinal source offron equa-ion k^.-.^/» -r
-
_-* 'inFLnee and on the source viiich Ie e?mected to be available ininvestnenv *xi»ti-i<i-'-t ——^—^^—
iod t-H.*^ Tiiis Ie because ^ - , vt^icb depenOE upon vhethcr rctcntionE or
• .
-'
"
nev share issucE are next period's marginal source of funds, affects the cost
*';'
;:.,ji;, nf ca-ital in period t,. Tne assurrption in the tax capitalization viev is that
..
- -
-I^'--"' mature firms vill never again issue nev shares anc alvavs set \___ = v , so that
?i®S:' jjjor-^nal source of funds in this and all future periooB is retained earr-inps.
'^^K^E^'' "We can therefore set X^ = X = (a-ia)/la-2 ), and find that
-'j.":'"-^?(5r..:.:ji..-- .. k, t . J.
'?'., :rw.
PiW: (1.23) (l-^)ir'X) - .
'^f;n^-] -
Acaia using a !I-Eyior approxinsatioa to the right band side, "the cost cf capital
"^p^:;'> .IHae. fiiridend tar rate has so effect cz "the cost cf capital, and peraaaest
-
^^ _
rhP.T^ges io drTideud taxes, uiu.ess accc=paaaed ty rnnnges in the capital gains
:,:;';. .rS-^': ^gj,-^
"cSll have no effect on -irrvestaerrt activity.
.?iv'-?i'i"'': 'L' ~ Tiis viev icplies that" the dividend tax is a luap sum levy on vealth
'^^^M^ in "the ccrpcrate sector at the time cf its iiroosition. The total value of
•I™-"^"
'--
-;r
corporate equity, usiiig aI.d; and defining I^ .. as the dividends paid to
-^^^.~i^ period t shareholders in period t"<-J
,
•
.
.
.
"::•: ;;.;-
:,--":"
--^More cosplete discusEions cf the iripcrtance of the marginal
X-l-i^C: source of funds over time may be found in Hing (197^), Auerbach (ipBSb, pp. •
j^^i.'-;:-:;' S2~5), and Edwards and Keen (ipBi;).
"hanpcE in the dividend tax rate therefore have direct effects on the totul
veJ-UC of outEXaniing equity, -^^ even though they do not affect the rate of return
earned on these shareB. The tax capitalisation viev treats current equity as
"trapped" vithin the corporate sector, and therefore as bearing the full bur-
den of the diridend tax.
Peraancnt changes in the diTidend tax rate vlll have no effect
on the firr's diridend pclir>'. Tne cost cf capital, hence the firr.'E invest-
aient end capital stoci:, are unaffected trj- dividend taxes. Dividend pajinerits,
"the difference between (a-T)II(ir K Y^ and invcEtment expenditures, are therefore
unaffected as veil. I'eicporary tax changes, however, do have real effects.
For exac^le, consider a tesporary dividend xax vticb is announced in period.
•t-1. It vUl set" the dividend tax rate to e in T>eriod t, "cut zero in all pre-
vicus Es'd subsecuest periods, we set c = D in all periods for convenience.
Since X^ = 1-r but >._j_ = 1 fcr all ^*D, ve can use ecustion (1-15) to deter-
sine "the period—"rrv-period cost cf capital around the tax change:
reriod t—
2
_
t-1 t_ t-1 '
Cost of Danital ^-^ ^-^ -r-^ r-—
.
_
. J.—' a-T j-T a-T
!irne general fcrssila Icr the cost' cf capital is
(1.26) c - (1-t)-^ ll - (i+^)-^(l AJ].
Sie cost cf capital depends in part on t'ne chanrre in the s'nadov value of capi-
tal vhich is exnected to taie nlace between one -Deriod and the next. Since
X is lov 'Decause cf the cl:viaen(f tax, tne cont cf capltf^l ie V::rh in the
e-iod i=mediatel.v prior to the iKpocltion cf the tax, and ] nv curinc
the taxed period. Cince chanpes in the cost of capith.1 have real effectL,
nTDoran' "^^^ changcE may alter investment and therefore dividend payout.
•^hlB result nny be seen intuitively. Finns vill go to ^eat len^hE to avoid
•paving dividends during a temporary dividend tax period. Ae a conBcquence,
they vill invest even in very lov productivity investmentB.
Finally, since the capitalization I'lev assumes that dividends face
tigber tax rates than capital gains, it predicts that shares vhich pay di%'i-
dends vill earn a higher pre-tax return to compensate shareholders fcr their
tax liatility. The after-tax capital market line corresponding to (1.20 ) is
(1.2T) P «= (l-E)d^ + (:i-t)£^
vhich can be revritten as ' "
(1.2B) B^=^^g|c/
vhere ?. = d. •+ g.. !rnere sho-jl-d be detectable differential returns on
1 2. 1
serurities vith different dividend fields.
There are tnro principal difficulties vith the capitEl.ination viev cf
dividend taxation. First, if marginal c is less than one and marginal and
average o are not very different, then firms should always prefer acquiring
cividend tax rates may actually raise equilibri-um capital intensity try reducing
the portfolio value of each unit cf ph^'sical capital. The discussion in tne
text precludes this possibility 'vy assuring that P is fixed.
_lt-
,.o--'Tjil tn- takeovers instead cf direct pi:rchases. T.'-.If ip because tne
DU'-chase price of a nev capital pood is ur.lty , b-jt tne mari'.et vulue cf capital
poods held tr)' other corporations is orJy (l-m)/ ( l-t )
.
Second, this viev's prettise is that dividends are the only way to
transfer noney out of the corporate sector. Firns are constrained in that
they cannot further reduce nev equity Ibeuce or increase share repurchases.
In the U.S. at least, there are nianj' methods potentially available to firms
viiich vish to convert earnings into capital pains. Tnese include both share
re-Durcbases and takeovers, as veil as the purchase cf equity holdinps or debt
in ctber firms and various other transactions. The proposition that all
marginal distributions must flov through the dividend channel may "r>e unte-
nable. The tax capitalization viev therefore does not erslain dividend payout
in any real sense. Bather it assumes that di^'idends must be paid and that
firms are not issuing nev shares end then analyzes the effect cf changes in
dividend tax rates.
A further difficulty* is this viev's assumption that dividend
payments are a residual in "the ccrpcrate accounts, and therefore subject to
substantial variation. The arrival cf ''good nevs," vrich raises desired
investment, should lead dividends to fall sharply. Most er^irical evidence-^
suggests both tbat dividend paTiTnents are substantially less volatile than
investment expenditures, and tbat managers raise di-N-idends vhen favorable
information about the firm's future "becomes available.
-^^he Eurvej' evidence reported m-- Lintner (l95o) and the
regression evidence in Fama and Babiak (lOoB ) suggest that nE-nagers adjust
dividend pajTuents slovly in response to nev information.
•"ne third viev cf diviaend %axaticr., vhich we labtl tne "traditiont-l"
viev takes a mare direct approach to r^sclvmc the dividend pu^Lle. It
arcues that for a variety of reasont, EhareholderB derive benefltE from the
Tiannent of dividends. Firms derive Bome advantage from the use of cash divi-
dends as a distribution channel, and this is reflected in their market value.
Viiile the force vtiich makes dividends valuable remains unclear, leading expla-
nations include the "Eipnalling" tt^'pctheciE, discuEsed for exanrple tnr Ross
(19TT), Bhattacharya (19T9), and Miller and Rock (19B3), the need to restrict
managerial discretion as outlined in Jensen and Meckling (1976), or possible
benefits conferred on dividend recipients (Shefrin and Statman (19B^)).
To model the effect of the payout ratio on Ebareholder's valuation of
the fim, ve must generalize our earlier analysis. A convenient device for
alioving for "intrinsic dividend value" is to assume that the discount rate
E-pplied to the firr's income strear depends c:: the payout ratio: p = ,
p{ v- -'." )> P' < C. Firms vticl: distribute a higher fraction cf their "crcfits i
are revarded vith a lower recui.rec rate of return. Tiiis changeE the
fundamental expression for the value cf the firz., equation (1.6), to
,77(1.29) V. = I B(t,j) \{^)K^, - T
vnere
(1.3D) B{tj)=^ii !i+,p{^^4^|—)/(:-!)]--.
>-i ^"-'''Vii
"Wbi-le dividend taxes maie dividend pa^-ments unattractive, the reduction in
discount rates vhich results from a higher payout ratio may induce firms to
pay dividends.
Tne firEt-order conditions characterinnf: tne fim's optimal propran;
are sliphtlj' different in this case than under the previous two views, because
the choice of dividend policy nov affects the discount rate. The new first
order conditions are Ehovn belov:
(l.ll*a) I^: \ "" \ " °
(1.15a) \: -\ - (I * ^)"'Vi - V^(:-T)II'(KJ
c^
^^
u V
(l.loa) I'f: . -1 - u^ - p^ «= 0, p (V^-V^) <
t t
P'V
(1.17a) r^: (^) -^ vv - ^^ - T^ -7. ^7 ,:. ,
,\
' V_ = D, K^-D^ < D
For converience, ve define P^ . = p(I)_^/(1-t )II_^ ), so the discoust rate ir each
period deperids oa the prerious period's payout ratio.
To solve these equations for marginal o and the cost cf capital., ve
assume that the retiims from paving dividends are sufficient to niaice D^ > D.
If "this vere not the case, then this viev vould reduce to the tax
capitalization aodel vhere dividenas are ^lust a residual. We assume as veil
that firms- are effectively on the nev eouity issue margin, bo \^ > "V .-'" This
l^'By introducing the p(D/(1-t)II) function ve admit the possibility
tnat D^ > and T^ > \ .
iniicates that firms are either iEsuing nrv snares or perfoming equivt.lent
transactionE at the mcrgir.. In this case, r = bo p_^ = -1 fron. (l.loh.) and
), =1 from (l.l^a). Tnerefore, the egullibriuir. vt^lue of mcrpinal q is unity.
t '
TiiiB follovE, because at the margin investorE are trading one dollar of afxer-
tax income for one dollar of corporate capital. For valucE of q Icbe than
unity, these transactionE vould cease.
The coBt of capital can also be derived from these conditiona.
Since V^ "" --. equation (1.17 a) may be revrittcn as
(l.-)(l*-^) ^
(1.31) ^ =
Tiiis expression may be used to sinplify (l.l5a}.:
P
- , D
(1.32)
-K * (1 -^r^^i'^K^, * (i-T)ii'(i:J + (1^) . .. :., • (i-t)r'(i:J
Assuring a^ = ?>^_^^ = 1» so that the firs is on the nev equiTj- as.rgir. in
both T>eriods, and ag£i.n approximating ip_^_^, /(l-i) ]/ ll+p_^ /(!-:,) ] =
7=^, ve find .
_
.
^—
1
P , -
- D
(1.33) - rji^ + (l.T)Ii;(E^)ll + (gj)
^33fyj-]
viiich can be vritten
P(nj
(l.3i*)
-(l~T)II'(iL)
il-Ei;c_^ t- U-l.Jii-C_^j
Lr hf
vnere c_^ = D_^ /(l-t )II_^ , the ciTidend payout ratio. The steadj' staxe cost of
CELplt^l is therefore
It involves e weighted average of the tax ratcE on dividends and capital gains,
vith weights equal to the dividend payout ratio.
The cost of capital vlll alBO be affected bj' a dividend tax change.
The precise effect may be found bj' differentiating (1.3M:
dc —ac cc dc
^^••^°' Du-aj 1 ^'j.-jL>D. T u-z; t j-QJ J fo d,l-n}'
The foregoing conditions for choice of D^ iirolj' —- = D at the optimal
dividend jjayout so we can vrite
^'•^''^ dU-n) c TT^^7o~^~Tl^TTU^nT
A reduction is the dividend ~ax vill therefore lower the cost of capites,
increasing cu.rrent investment Epending.
The traditional viev ir^lies
ecuilibrium capital intensitj' and the required refurr: P Bay rise. Under the
e^vtrese assurrrtion what capital is supplied inelasticaUlT, the cn2j effect of a
dividend tax cut is an increase in the ecuilicriur rate of rcturz:, P. If capi-
tal vas supplied vith sorje positive- elasticitj', then a reduction in the dividend
tax rate voulfl raise "both capital intensity and the rate of return. •''?' Dividend
taa changes can have substantial allocative effects.
The traditional %'iev suggests that as dividend taxes fall, the divi-
^'In the partial equilibriuic nodel described here, the supply of
capital is perfectly elastic at a rate of return p(c). Therefore, the whole
adjustment to the new equilibrium would involve changes in capital intensity.
-?w-
dend pevout ratio Ehould rise. Tne firx equates the inarplnal 'Denerit *totl iiv
dend pa-.TncntB vlth tne raarpinL.1 tax coct cf tnose pa^Tnents. Diviaenc tax
reductions, vhether tezTporar;.- or permanent, vlll lower the raarpinal coct of
obtaining sipnalling or other benefitE, and the optimal payout ratio Ehould
therefore rise.-^
Finally', ve Ehould note the inplicationB of this view for the relu-
tive pre-tax returns on different Becurlties. The pricing relation is a
generalisation of (1.2B):
pfc )
(1.3B) \ =-Trr* 'z^^^i'
Tiiis isplies tvo effectE for dividend j-leld. First, in periods vhen firm i
actually pays diTidends (d > O), the measured pre-tax return vill rise to
coCTensate investors for their resulting t.ax liabilitrv'. However, even in
periods vner no dividend is paid, the required return on hi^er yield stocrs
aav be lover than on 1~.- yield stocks as a result cf the signaULing or ether
"r..7!e it aay provide an explanation cf the dividend purtle, "the tra-
ditional viev depends critically on a clear reason for investors ~o value iigii
dividend payout, cut as yet provides culy veaJk activation for the p(c) func-
tion. -9 It is particularly difficult- xo understand viiy firms use cash dividends
as opposed xo less heavily xajced means of communicating information to their
l&This discussion does not address the possibility of changes in the
signalling equilibrium as a result cf xax change.
^5:Elacl: (ipTo), Etiglitz (ipBO), and Edvards (ipBi)) discuss mam-
of the proposed explanations for "intrinsic dividend vsl.ue" and find them unsa-
tisfactory in some dimension.
shErehclderB. Ar. aiiition£.: difficulty vith thie virv if tnat firms rarely
issue nev equity. It is possible tntit pver tnouj;^ fims issue sharer- ir.frt—
auently, however, nev equity is still the marginal source of I\inds. For
example, some fimiE nu-ght use short-terXi borroving to finance pro^lects in
vears vhen they do not issue equitj', and then redeen; the debt vhen they
finally' issue new Ebares. Moreover, the vide variety of financial activities
described above vhich are equivalent to share repurchase may allow firms to
operate on the equity- issue as-rgin vithout ever seZJLing shares
.
1,D £v~t°ry
1e tiiis section, we have described three distinct I'ievs of the econonic
effects of dividend Taxation. Vh.ile we have treated them as opposing alter-
natives, they nay each "oe partially correct. Different firms may "De on dif-
ferent financing margins, and the tax rates on marginal investors nay also
differ across firms. "We allow for both these possibilities in interpreting
the empirical results reported "oelov.
-able 1 s-urmarizes the cost of capital and equilibrium "c" under
each of the alternative vievs. we also report each riev's prediction for the
responsiveness of investment, the payout ratio, and the pretax return prer^un
earned by diTidenQ-paying shares to a permanent increase in the dividend tax
rate. In subsenuent sections, ve test each of these different predictions •using
British data from the post-var period.
Tne Alternative VipvE cf Tiviaend Taxation
Traditional
Y:ev
J.a>:
V:ov
.rrtipvance
Cost
of Capital
ia)
lU-r^ya t- U-:. J U-u;j U-i i ij-zMli-i J i-t
am
<:
6a
am
<
Marginal "^"
--a
LiTidenfl Presium
in Pre-tax Betums
P-: ir>-:
reference. Tne level of investaent is 1, il is the icarpinal dividend tax
rate, end n is "the dividend paycut rs-tic. AH cf "the "t£.x changes are
EES".raed to be "ceraanent.
-2i-
Tne previous sect-ior. 'e r;t.vli2ed discuEEior cC taxes focused or; tne
United States' tax environment. Since our empirical tents rely on the loi^lor
changes in British tax policj' that have occurred over the last three decades,
this section deBcribes the evolution of the U.K. tax system vith respect to
dividends. Subsequent sections present our empirical results.
In the United States, discrininatorj'- taxation of dividends and retained
earnings occurs at the shareholder level, vhere dividends and capital pains
are treated differently. In Britain, hovever, there have been some periods
vhen ccTDsrations also faced differential tax rates on their retained and
distributed income. During other periods, the Tjersonal and corporate tax
systems vere "integrated" to allov sharebolders to receive credit for taxes
vhich bad been paid at the corporate level. Betveen 19^5 and 1973, Britain
experimented vith a tax B^'stem sisiilar to that of the post-var United States.
rive different s^'steas of dividend taxation bave "oeen tried in Britain curing
tbe last three decades.
!:-vo surzEary paraneters are needed to describe the effects cf the
various tax regimes on dividends. Tbe first, vzLzz measures tbe anoust of tbe
tax discrimination at "tbe sbarebclder level, is tbe irvestrr tar Treferer.ce
ratio (o). It is defined as tbe after-tax income vticb a sbarebclder receives
vben a firm distributes a one pound dividend, divided "ry bis after-tax
receipts vben tbe fine's^ sbare price rises "rn' one pound. 20 in -the United
States, 6 = (l-a)/(l-i). Tbe investor tax preference ratio is central to ant-
2^or consistency, in our section on ex-dividend price changes it
viI2 prove helpful to focus on tbe dividend announced 'ry tbe fire. Prior to
March, 19T3, that was tbe gross di"\-idend in tne notation of King (19TT). After
19T3, it vas tbe net dividend. we define 6 relative to tbe announced di'^'idend.
"'vine share price .novements around e>-liviQend oays, Eince if r. and z are the
tax rates reflected in marnet prices, then a fim payir.f a diviaend cf d
should experience a price crop cf 6d.
Tne second parameter vhich may affect investment and payout deci-
Eions is the total tar nreference ratio (6). It is defined as the amount of
art,er-tax income vhich Ehareholders receive vhen a firm ubce one pound of
after-tax profits to increase its dividend payout, relative to the amount of
after-tax income vhich Ehareholders vould receive If the firm retained this
pound. In the American tax srs'ster., vhere corporate tax payments are unaf-
fected bj' payout policy, 6 = 6= (a-r:)/(j-z ). In Britain, the relationEhip is
more corplex and depenQs on the change in corporate tax pa^-mentE vhich results
from a one pound reduction in gross di'v'iQends. Tills variable detersines firm
payout policy under the traditional viev of diridend taxation and equ.llibriuiii
under the tax capitaliiation "ajTsotheEis.
*«.*j^* _ay nemmes
To characterize the changes in £ and £ «"^iich pro-ride the basis for
ciir e=r:irical tests, ve consider each British tax regime in rum. we fcH-tw
I^ing (157T) and express the tc^al tax "curden on corporate income as a ftinction
of "the prevz^JLing tax code parameters, end then derive S and £. More detailed
discussions of Britisli dividend taxation may be found in King (19TT), House of
Commons (iFTl), the Corporation Tax Green Paper (ipBz), and Tilej- (197B).
King (19T7) follovE a different procedure for the post-iPTS regime. Although
tiiis leads to some semantic differences, the results vith respect to 6 are
identical.
.'>'^_
?rior X.0 tne jP52 buapet, firm^ laced e tvc—tier ^ax pyctecL vlth dif-
ferent tax rates on distriouted and undistributed income. Tne tax code vas
described bj' s, the standard rate of income tax, t , the tax rate on undistri-
buted profitB, and t the tax rate on distributed profitE. Tnere was no
capital gains tax, bo 7=0. Corporations were subject to both income taxes and
profits taxes, although profits taxes could be deducted from a coinpanj''E
income in calculating income tax liability. Income tax was paid at rate s.
The corporate tax liability cf e corporation vlth pre-tax profits H and gross
dividend pajTnents D vas-^
(2.1) T^ = Is + (1-e)t ]{u~-d) -f (I-s)t.DU Q
= I(1-e)t + e)II + I(1-e)(t^ - T )-e)D .
u d u
In acditicL., shareholderE vere liable for
(2.2)
In practice, part cf this t£j: vas ccliected 'rrr -the ccrpcration vhen it paid
di-Tidends; it vithheld sD as prepa^-nsnt cf part cf the saarehclder ' s tax.
E'risrebclderE therefere received (l—s )D irsediateiy af^er e gross ciTidend 2
vas paid. A taxpayer vbose. marginal r^te ve3 greater than s vould eu'd-
seouently be liable for taxes of {u—e)D; one vith bKe voiild receive a refund.
Tne investor tax preference ratio for -this s:\'Eteiii is easj' to derive.
The, Eharenolder ' s e^er-tax income associated vith a one pound dividend equals
^The term gross dividends refers to dividends received m' share-
holders prior to paying shareholder taxes, "nut after the payment of all cor-
porate taxes. Kote that King (15TT) uses G to represent gross dividends, and
D for net dividends. "We use D for gross di^'idends.
_?i_
(j-e) vnere r. is tne in£irj;int.I ciiviaencf tax rate. Since tnere are no taxep on
ca-cltB.1 pE-inc, tne sharehclder tax pre'erence ratio is i •= Ij-r.).
Vie can also compute 6 for this tax repime. To raise prosE dividends
by one pound, the firm mist forego ll ^ (TT /dD] pounds of after-tax reten-
tions. The second term is the marginal change in tax liability vhich rcEults
from raising D by one pound. The parameter 6, vhich is the change in gross
dividends per pound of foregone retentions , is defined as
(2.3)
dT^ (:-s)(i ^ - - T )
rrom (2.2). The total tax preference ratio is defined tiy
[2.h) e = 66
Q li
For most investors vho paid taxes at rates above the standard rate of income
tax, the tax E^'ster discririnated against dividend payo-jt. In addition,
T exceeded t^, , sometimes "ry as such as forty percentage points.
"'05?— '"5: I^*"^'^e'"E'"t'' a'^ t>».^^-— c ""•E.r '^.e—-•"«>
"""
The tax lav vas changed in 1952 to elirinate the dedraction cf profit
taxes fror income s-jbject to income tax. Tne analysis of this tax regime clo-
sely parallels that above. This B:\'-stem required the firm to, pay
(2.5) t'^ = is + T.](i;-D) + T.D = (s + T )n + (t.-t -s)D
u a ' II a -a
vhile for Ehareholders (2.2) continued to bold. The pajTuent of a one pound
gross dividend vould again provide the shareholder vitb (l-a) pounds of after-
"tax income, so S = (l-m). Fcllov-ing the earlier expression for 6 ve find
-3C-
Ji— = -: -- -E, so
(2.6) e ^ 1 , ^H, ..
d u
and
3-TIl
(2.T) e = ^^^ E "< 1 , - 1
TiiiE tax systcffi vas less favorable to the pa%Tnent of dividendE than the pre-
riouB regime had beer., since bj' eliiiinating deductability of profits tax it
increased the burden induced bj' differentiel corporate profitE tax rates.
tP5P.,iQd1j: Sincle^-rate Profit? Tax
In I95B, Chancellor Barber Amory announced a inajor reform in cor-
porate taxation. The differential profits tax vas replaced by a single-rate
•arofits tax: aI2 profits vere taxed at the rate t
,
regardless of a firr:'E
P
dividend policy. In additior., the firr: vas 2j.able for income tax at rate e on
-— e vT^d"^ stributed ea''"^i**'*E ^r^i"^ e "^ v^^bh^*^ d s3 ^«» sba^*ehcld^**s ' inco"^^ tax
rate e on gross dividends, rut since firms vere not subjiect to income tax on
distri'Duted profits, there vere off settinr "surdens at the tvo levels. Tne
total tax burden on corporate source income vas
(2.B) t'^ = (e + T )II - sD
P - , .
T,
~
,
.
"
1
vhile T^ = nD. Tnis implies £ = (1-m), but 6 ^ • , so
(2.9) e = (l-n)/(l-E).
For values cf tne itcrpmaI "tax rate near the r.tanaerd rate cf income tax, thie
tax FVEteiL IE. neutral vlth respect tc dintributior, vzliry .
Tor hiprier mcrpi-
1 rates 1* diEcrii::inateE against dividendB. however, it was a more lavoraLle
tax svBteE for dividends than either of the previouE repimes.
2 qf c;_T o'^;^: ClaBsical CoTDoratlon Tax
The Labour Party \'ictoTy in IQ^'^ marked the beginning of harsher
taxation of corporate income. The 1965 Finance 2111 introduced a nev BVEtem
of corporate taxation parallel to that ir the United States. PrcfltE vere
taxed at a corporate tax rate, ' , and there vas no distinction between
c
retained and distributed earnings. This ixplies T" »= t H, and since dT /dD =
C, 6=1. Sharebolders continued to pay dividend taxes at rate &. However,
the shareholder preference ratio vas altered bj' the introduction in earlj' 19^5
of a capital gains tax at a flat rate of 30 percent on all realized gains.
Lach asset was ascribed a taxable 'oasis its vaiue on 6 April 19^5 • '*^e iise
iH^ginal capital gains tax rate, tailing
account cf the reductions affcreed by deferred realizaticc -- The investor tax
preference ratio fcr this tax s;\'-ste2. is S = (1-e)/!1-z). Eince 6 = 1,
6 = {Z.-Zl)/{1~z). li^iJie the previous tax regine, the class icF.l Evster made no
attempt -to avoid the double taxation cf dividends. As a result, the dividend
tax. burden vas substantially heavier than that under the 195c^6it systea.
IPT? - Present: The lmutat:Lon Svstem
The Conservative return to pcwer in 1970 set in motion a further set
of tax reforms, directed at reducing the discriminatorj' taxation of dividend
'^'^eferred realization is one of the techniques vhicb enables
American investors to lower their capital gains tax liability. Trading so as to
generate short-term losses and long-term gains, tailing advantage of the dif-
o^-
-n'^ome. Tne current tax FvstcE reser.tiep tne FVEtec: vhich was used betveen
1056 and IQf>^, vlth BPvert.1 differences. All corporate prcfitB ere taxed at
the ccrpcration tax rate, t . Vnen firms pay dividends, thrj- are required to
pay Advance Corporation Tax (ACT) at a rate of t per pound of proBs dividends.
Hovever viiile in the 195f'-6i4 regime this tax on dividends wue treated
as a -withholding of inveritor Income taxes, under the current regime It is a
prepaviuent of ccmorate tax. At the end of ItE fiscal year, the firm pays
T L-T D in corporate taxes, tailing full credit for its earlier A^T pE^^nentE. -^
Since total corporate tax pajTnentE equal t 1 , 6 = 1 under this tax BVEteiu.
ShareholderE receive a credit for the firiL's ATT pajTner.t. A Ehart?-
bolder calculates tiE tax by first inflating iiis dividend receipts trj' 1/(j-t )
a
and then applying a tax rate of a. Hovever, he is credited vith tax pa^Tnents
of T /(l-T ), so his effective narrinal tax rate is (tt-T )/(i_t }. If his
a a a a
narginal income tax rate Ie above t ", the i:rputation rate, then he is liable
for additional di-v-ldend taxes. ShareholderE vlth imrginal. tax rates belov
T are elicible for tax refunds.
a
The shareholder tax preference ratio under the i=rjtatioc systea
is civen by
ferential taxes on the "cwo, is aucther technique; it is unavailable to British
investors, since the tax rate on all gains iE equal. Etep-up of asset basis
at death is another feature of the U.S. tax code viiich Invers effective capi-
tal gains ratcE still further. Prior to 19T1, estates in the T.II. vere eu"d-
^ect to both estate dutj' and capital gains tax on assets in the estate. Since
I9TI, however, capital gaans liabilitrj' has "been forgiven at death and heirs
become liable for capital gains tax only on the difference betveen the price
vhich they receive vhen they dispose of the asset, and it's value at the time
of inheritance.
25lf It G > T^H], the firm is unable to fully recover its ACT
pavTnents. The ''unrelieved ACT" may "oe carried fonrard indefinitely and baci-
vards for a period of not more than two years. A substantial fraction of
British firms are currently unable to recover their full. ACT pa^Tnents and
^n:
a
(2.10) f - -T-^
Since 6 = 1, ve knov 0=6 and can revrite this as
(2.11) e-urrrrirry
The iinputation rate has tj-pically been BCt equal to the standard rate of
income tax, the rate paid hy noEt tajnaayerE (hut not most dividend
recipients). For standard rate taxpevers, the imputation systen provides an
incentive for paying dii'ldends; retentions yield taxable capital gains, but
there is essentially no tax on di^'ldendE at the shareholder level. For indi-
viduals facing marginal dividend tax rates above the standard rate, there may
be an incentive lor retention, "Drovided m > : + t (j-i,). Pension Tunds and
"
- ^ a
other -jmaxed investors have a clear incentive wO prefer dividend payments.
For these inves-crs, e = r = and the tax s^'sten pro"\'ides a sudsicj', since
one •Dound of dividend income is effectively vcrtb 1/(1-t ) Tjsunds. Finally,
firss to -pz-j dividends. They are alloved ~o rerlair ATT paid ty corporations
in viiicb they held shares only up to the amount of ATT paid bj- the brokerage
firm in regard to its dividend distribution. Thus, for manj' brokers, marginal
•dividend- receipts cannot be inflated by the 1/(j-t ) factor.
a
therefore face corporate tax discrimination be~veen retentions and distribu-
tions. See Mayer (19B2) and ilang (19B3) for further details on the voriiings
oi..^ * «m
Table 2 EunmarizeE the tax parameters lor each different tax repinie.
It relates i> and 6 to the profitB tax rates, invcEtor dividend tax rates, and
capital gainB tax rates. EEtimates of 6 and 6 based on weiphted-average margi-
nal tax rates are reported in Table 3. The values of n and z vhich ve used to
compute these Etatistics are weighted averages of the marginal tax rates faced
fey different tlasses of inveEtors, vlth weights proportional to the value of
their Ehareholdings. Tnese weighted average tax rates were first calculated bj'
Zing (15TT) EJid have beer updated in King, Naldrett, and Poterba (lOBM.
These ~ax rates are indicative of the na^lor changes in tax policy
vhicb have occurred over time. If one tj'pe of investor is in fact "the marginal
investor," then the weighted averages are substantial ^y risleading as indicators
of "the tax rates guiding market prices. Even if this is the case, however,
"there is still sosie information in our time series since the xax burden for most
types cf investors moved in the same direction in each tax reform. Ve present
ertiricf.1 eridence belov suggesting the relevance cf weighted average marginal
tax rates.
The time series movements in S and 6 deserve some comment. The
diridend tax "curden was hea-riest in the' 195^53 ^^^ 19-?-T3 T>eriods, and
lightest in recent years. The most dramatic changes in 5 occur in 19^5
(capital gains tax) and 1973 (irrputation). For 6, there are additional
changes in 195B and 19do.- These substantial changes raise the prospect of
detecting the effects cf dividend taxation on the behavior of individuals and
firms. Similar descrintive statistics for the United States tax sj'-stem would
Tax Code ParamrterE and I^iviocnd "axatlon
Tax
Dirferential
ProriXE Tax I
5>E-T
1P52
j.nves^cr
lax Pre'crcnce
:-n
lax Trclcrence
1:-e)U4Tj^-t^)
rirfcrcntlal 1952-
ProriXB Tax U 1P5B a -in
j-n
^-« "
'd - ^u
Einple Tia^e
Prcfi-B T'ax
1P5B-
1P65
j-n J -a
J-B
Classical IOdd-
CcrDora^ion 1-uz. 19T3
-•-a -•-a
SyBtcn
T C ' ^^
U-T^JU-ZJ
J-E
licTic: Set test fcr I'.irtber ce^£.llp end "DE^Ese^cr derini^ioas.
Tabic 3
British Tax Kates, iPSC-Sl
Inves-wCr Tax '.CLa.
nvioend Tax Capital Cjams Prelerence Tax Preference
Year Ketp (r*^ I'ar hat? (r ^ hat:r li ^ hatir (f )
1950 C.56B 0.000 0,1^32 C.67I)
1951 C.575 C.OOO 0.1*25 0.619
1952 D.560 O.DOO 0.i*l40 O.59B
1953 C.5^5 D.OOO 0.i,'55 0.612
195^4 C.530 0.000 0.1j70 0.621
1955 C.51B D.OOO 0.1)82 D.62I)
1956 C.517 C.OOO 0.1jB3 0.596
1957 C.515 C.OOO 0.1)85 0.575
195B C.5C2 C.OOO OpB 0.673
1959 C.ijBB C.OOO 0.512 C.B07
i960 C.ii95 C.DDO 0.515 C.BI4O
1961 0-i;B5 C.OOO 0.515 C.B1)1
1962 C.ijBi^ C.OOO 0.516 O.B^3
1963 0.i<B3 C.OOO 0.517 C.BU
196I4 C.5D9 C.OOO 0.1)91 c.Bdi
1965 C.529 C.13B 0.550 C.936
1966 C.5DD C.17i* C.60B C.706
1967 C.iiBB 0.173 C.619 c.619
196B D.itB3 C.169 0.622 0.622
1969 C.J;72 C.157 C.627 0.627
1970 C.i;5D C.152 - 0.61)1 0.61)1
1971 L.'^hk' C.I50 C.65I+ C.65I+
1972 C.l;25 C-li4B C.67I) 0.674
1973 L.Zlk C.ll'3 C.916 C.916
lQ7i C.105 C.133 1-D32 C.97B
1975 C.Okh C.130 l.DQii 0.970
1976 -D.DOit C.151 1.156 1.019
1977 —0.D31 C.13i;/ 1.190 1.055
197B -O.DiiO 0.135 1.232 1.070
1979 -D.D^3 0.136 1.207 1.01)1
IpBO _r> -. n-l C.13k- 1.x 1
1
1.0^7
I9BI -D.12D 0.133 1.292 1.061;
Botes: Coluian 1 is the veigiited average SE-r^inal tax rs.t;e on eH EhareholQers
,
reported oy iZing tl977, p.26B) and updated try- Hing, Kaldrett, and
Poterba (I9BI)). Tnis is the ^iaie series for r* = (u-t )/(1-t ) as
reported in the text. Coliinn 2, the effective capital gains tax
rate, is also dravn from Hing (1977). Colusns 3 and 1) vere con—
puted try the authors as descibed in the text. They way not correspond
exactly to cal ablations based on ColuimE 1 and 2 since thej' are averages
of quarterly ratios.
''^splav far iever movenientE ir, tne por.t.var period, and jtt- cramatic ,1ur:p&.
The use of legal chanpcE to ider.tifj' economic relationshlpE is
alvBVB problematic Eince such chanpes nny themselveE be endopenouE responBeE
to econoniic conditionB. The hiBtorj' of BrltiEh corporate tax reform provides
little reason to think that this is an inportant problem for our enrpirical
vork. Ma^lor refomiE tj'pically followed elections vhich brought about changes
in the governing party. For exanple the I965 reforms closely followed the
Labour party's '.'ictorj- in the I96I4 election, and the 1573 reform was a con-
sequence of the Conservative •\'lctcrj'- in the 1970 elections. A read.ing of the
press reports suggests that corporate tax reform was not an issue in either
electioii.
The remainder of the paper is devoted to various tests of how the tax
changes described in this section have influenced (i) the market's relative
valuation of dividends and capital gains, (ii) the decisions made bj- firms
vith respect tc their dividend payout, and (iii) the investment decisions cf
3t-
Tne changes in invcEt-or rax ratcB on dividend income and capltL.1 pcins
provide opportunities for testine the "tax irrelevance" view tr)- exaiiininc share
price novementE around ex-dividend days. If marginal investorE value dividend
income as much as thej' value capital pains, then on ex-dividend days share
prices should decline ty the full amount of the dl^-ldend pa.-^nnent. If the
marginal investors are taxed more heavily on dividends than on capital painE,
hovever, then share prices v-ill fall by less than the dividend paraent.
Moreover, if marginal investors are untaxed, then changes in investor dividend
tax rules should not affect the marginal valuation of dividendE and capital
gains. ^^
KumerouE authors, including ULton and Gruber (IPTO), Black and
Scholes (19T3), Green (ipBo), Kalay. (I9B2), Eades, Hess and Eim (19BI4),
Auerbach (ipBSa), Hess (I9B2}, and ethers, have used daily data to analyze
relative share price movements in the lizited States. Although their results
are costroversial, these studies suggest that share prices decline on ex-days,
"nut "cy less thaa the amoust of the dividend. These results have "oeea
interpreted as cczfirrLing the rypothesis that marginal investors are "taxed.
British data provide an cppcrtusitj* for stunjing the general issue
of vhether tsjces aTfect dividend valuatioii, as veil as the role of short term
trading in deterring the ex-dividend day beharior of share prices. As noted
in the last section, there have been substantial changes in the investor
tax preference' ratio during the last tventy-five years. The principal changes
^^Even if the nerginal investor is untaxed, changes in the corporate
tax ratcE on dividends and retained earnings vill alter the market ' s valuation
n-f dDvinendE. However, since those changes affect ccrnorate tax liability'.
occurred in 1P65 and 1CT5.
There have eJ.sd been iCTOi-t-ant cnanpeE in the tax rates aflectinc
BecuriticE traderE involved in tax arbitrage around o-dividend davB. The
most Eignificant chanpcE affecting short tern; traderE were introduced in the
1970 Finance Act.^^ Prior to 19T0, "dividend Btripping" bj' trading around ex-
davB vaB apparently widespread. Since then, however, the Inland Revenue haB
been empowered to levj' penalties on investors engaging in Bccurities transac-
tionB viiich are principeJLly nntivated tiy tax considerations. For an indivi-
dual investor, if trading around ex-dEvs (i.e., selling shares before the
ex-day and repurchasing them later) reduces his tax liability bj' nore than 10
percent in anj- year, the tax sa-^'ings from these transactions any be voided t^'
the Ir.land Bevenue.
After 19TD, trading "by institutions around ex-days could be declared
void if they bought and then sold the saae share vithin one month of its ex-
ciTidend day. If its transactions are disallowed, the institution could be
required to pay taxes, ir spixe of its tax-exerrpt status. Eince 19T0, a
dealer vho trades in a security around its ex-day and holds his shares for
ith
taxable income.^ A fraction of his capital loss, var^-ing inversely vith the
ex-dividend day.'
^^The enti-divldend stripping provisions in the 1970 Act are
described in Tiley (197B), pp. 76l-i< , end Ilaplanis (ipBS).
2D{.«£_ijLg^ gjj^ Scholes (I9B2) suggest broiiers and dealers as the ex-
daj' "crice setters.
-3'-
holdinc r!criod, le distill nved for *^ax purposes, k? tne hcldinf: period aecli-
res to only the ex-day, tne Iractior. disulloved riBes to nearly 100 percent.
The interactions; among these tax provicionB are difficult to
descri'De, aJid the extent to vhich the Board of Inland Revenue exercised its
authority remainE unclear. However, one cannot doubt that the opportunlticB
for avoiding taxes bj' trading around ex-days were Bubstantially reduced in
19TD. To the ertcnt that trading around ex-dayE is iapcrtant in dctemining
ex-dividend price ffiovementE , ve vould expect to observe noticable changes in
dividend valuatioii, if at aZJL, only around 15TC. This should be contrasted
vith the traditional and tax capittJ-ization ^-levs, vhich predict najor changes
in the relative value of dividends and capital pains vhen the tax reforms
Effecting ordinary investorB occurred but none vhen rules affecting dividend
stripping toot place.
rn.A Data and Metnodr^
To estiss.te the share price response to dividends, ve obtained da^ly data
on the share prices and divadends cf sixteen large r.H. firms. A lasting cf
the firms in our data set and further "nacigrcund data zszy be found in ?c-erba
and Summers (ipB^e-). '^^'e obtained a listing cf e>:-dividend da-es from the
London Business School Share -Price Data Base, and then consulted ricrcfilm
copies of the London Financial Tines . The closing share prices on the trading
day before the ex-date and the ex-date itself were recorded for each firm. 2B
"Tne data used in this section are described, end further results
are reported, in Poxerba and Summers (ipBi+a).
^"The prices used are the average cf closing bid and asked prices.
-•^-_
Fo- each firr: ir- tne saTTHjle, vt incluoed £.11 e>-aE:.eF. hCT.veeri 19" arid ]Q^:
corresponding to cash divioend paymentF vhich vere taxable as ordina-n- income
and not acconpanied b}' any dividend riphtE, stoci; options, or other Epecial
featurcB. Ou.t data set contained 633 ex-davE, distributed evenly among the
vears 1955-Sl. We also obtained data on the value of the ?inancial Timgs
Industrial Ordinary Share Index, and used this index to construct a market
return Bcries.
Ve estimated the follov aiodel for Bj_^, the total pretax return on
security' i:
lOBl
(3.1) P. ^e +P*B +1 CI d "t--^
-t"
'-'•'- -•' 2*^ ^_-ioci; J *' ^*''' "^
vbere ?l___^ is the iii£.rket return, E is a fim specific intercept ters:, P^ is a
cornsany-ETjecific coefficient viiich should resenhle the security' 's beta. tTne
dividend ^T-eld on each day is d.__^, vhere J denotes the year in vhich the divi-
dene falls, we also estirs-ted (3.1 ) constraining B^. to "t>£ constant across firas
Both ecuations vere estimated bj' a generalised least scuares 'nrocedure
vhict allcwed for hE-erosceaasticity across different firss. Eince there vere
fev instances in vhich tvo firms had coincident ex-dEys, ve did net need to
correct for residual correlation across firms.
_
Vhen tvo tax regimes occur vithin one year, ve allov for tvo C 's in
that year. The Z coefficients reflect the excess pretax return on ex-
dividend days, and therefore correspond to 1-5 for each year. If the "tax
irrelevance" viev is correct, then the parameter Z should not depend upon the
relative tax rates on dividends and capital gains. ^9 IJnder the other "v-ievs ve
-ic-
vDuld expezx, i, tc var^- over tmc, especially vner tne irpl:^at,io^. FVEtec va?
introduced in 19T3 tut also as the corrposltion cf cnarenolaerE verier over
tiine.30
III.B ResultE
The rcEultE of eEtimatine (3.1) are Ehovn In Table k. The a coef-
ficients are clearly' Bubject to substantial variability over time, even vhen
the tax svEten does not vary'. Hovever, there iE a pronounced drop in the
eBtimated coerficientE beginning in the second hcJLf of lpT3. There is even a
clear difference in the estimates for the firEt and second halves of 19T3.
This suggestE the irrportance of the 1973 isputation reform in altering the
relative valuation of dividends and capitEil gains. The difference 'in the
average value of Z "between the 1965-73 and 1973+ tax regimes is C.51, vtich
corresponds verv closely to the value cf C.5^ computed from the weighted
average marginal tax rates in Table 3.
The estimated coefficients did net change substantially, however,
vhen the capital gains tax vas introduced in 19-5. Tiiis say indicate that
effective marginal capital gains tax rates vere actually negligible.
Ccnstantizides 'ipBS) and Etiglitz (19B3) have sbovn "tnat optimal pcrtfclio
nonprofit institutions and personal investors engaged in tax-free accumulation,
as veil as to naive personal investors paring high marginal dividend "axes.
For Becurities dealers and brokerE, however, vho were unable to fully reclaim
the Advance Corporation Tax on the dividend thej' received, the tax change
should have had a smaller effect.
30Approximately 6 percent of British equity was held "bv iu:taxed .
institutions in 1957; 'ay 198D, the fraction had risen to 2d percent.
>aLj.e
"ne Stock MarKel's Relative Vt.luatior. cf I'iviaends &ni Capital Clams: 1P5!;>-^1
Yea'-
1955
1956
1957
1956
1959
i960
1961
1962
1963
IPoi*
1965
1966
1967
I96B
1969
1970
19T1
1972
1973
197^
19T5-
1976
1577
197B
19T9
19BO
19BI
Mooel
V'itnc-J-
nv< _„»
Iypr: 1. • e
Koat.- Averapt- -a>,
Hht « Vaiv)«^
.637 (.loM .601. (.IQS) .516
.1^9 (.177) .20B (.IBI) .517
.^39 (.165) .501 (.171) .515
.393 (.151) .^^51 (.155) .502
.537 (.1B2) .610 (.187) .1.86
.361 (.201) .^kl (.207) .I465
.li^2 (.207) -.056 (.213) .I4B5
.376 (.19M .1^57 (.199) .14B1<
.276 (.205) .360 (.210) .1.63
.050 (.17M .105 (.IBO) .509
.30M .lB6)/.5i46(.2l40) .35l(.lBB)/.'^b9[.2U2) .533/.i*27
.272 (.150) .300 ..155) .392
.259 (.ll;B) .301 .152) .3Bl
.251* (.190) .30B .195) .376
.kSO (.IBO) >99 .1B7) .373
.^•59 (.151) .51B .155) .359
.29B (.li^5) .239 .150) .3^6
.i^55 (.IBD) .519 .IB9) .326
.365 [ .3D5)/-.0«i*(.297) .36B(,290)/-, DIM. 333) .302/-.109
.li<6 (.160) -.OBB ( .166) -.032
.600 (.165) -.551 ( .192) -.001+
.031 (.161*) -.005 ( .171) -.156.
,
.10? (.17J;) -.072 ( .180) -.190 •
.115 (.16B) -.036 ( .Ilk) -.202 •
.056 (.137) -.019 ( .1^3) -.207
.093 (.139) -.029 ( .1^3) — T^i
.D6i {rik5) -.023 ( .1^9) -.252
Averare t •^ o^ *
Be?i3ffi I (1955-65)
?.e?i2!£ H (I965--3)
I^egims HI (15T3-B1)
.30B
.369
-.1^3
.376
.1^15
-.095
.^^99
.36B
.Ilk
Eotes: "he coefficients in CDlimmB 1 and 3 vere estimated froni the eauation:
I9BI
^oi.-^^-
=1956
The results in Colurm 1 irrpose the restriction B
^^^
^
^P' ^-^ ~» vhile those in
col-usn 3 do not ispose this restriction. Tne data in the last ccluan are the
liiTidend retu.m preziia, [ (n.—t )/(!-: ) - zj /(1-t) =1-6, calculated froin the
veighted average tax rates reported in Tahle 2. See Poterha and Summers (19Bl+a},
for further descrixition.
-i,:-
stratefies can subcLantially reaucc eflective capital pamr tax rates, bo tne
naive assurrptions of constant turnover probatilltier uned in conctructin£ - in
Table 3 vs^' be substantially incorrect.-'-^
There is also little change in the estimatetJ coefficients before and
after 1970, vhen the ex-day trading restrictions were introduced. This is
evidence against the importance of Ehort-term trading in detenaining the beha-
vior of share prices around their ex-davs, and vhen coupled vith the chanpes
in valuation around 19T3, suggests tt^at %-ievE v^.ich hold that a weighted
average narginal tax rate affects security inarket ecullibriuTn are rcre
accurate descriptions of realitj' than those vbich assume that marginal
investors are 'broker-dealerE.
While the annual ex-day coefficients in Table i* are informative
about hov taxes may affect Becuritj^ values, thej' are not "tests" in any usual
sense. To test the proposition that the estimates of Z reflect.ed tax rates,
ve cc=3are cur estimate of Z for eac'r vear vlth (1-5) in T-able 3. The
hypcthesis that Z^ = d-^^), £-11 ~, vas -rejiettec at standard significance
t ^
levels. However, tests of the hypcthesis Z = (a-"^ )/(1-t ), imposing z^ = D,
die not reject the rull. This agEjLn suggests that while cur measures cf capi-
tial gains tax rates may be verj' imprecise indicators cf actual tax rates,
underlying variation in dividend tax rates as measured ty our crude weighted
averages is reflected in share price movements.
The results reported here suggest the potentially substantial
influence cf dividend taxation on the stock market's relative valuation of divi-
^"^The capital gains tax rate series computed "Oy King (19TT), which
we report, assumed that shareholders followed a policy of liquidating ten
percent of their equity holdings each year, regardless of their trading gains o:
dends and CEpitul pains. hnvrver, vhiie oaily share price mnvemente are liKely
to vield the most precise evioence on dividend valuation, tney may be cor.-
taxiinaxed bj^ unuBual return patterns around ex-devE or other subtle factors. 32 if
taxes play an important role in the valuation of dividend income, then it should
also be possible to detect this phenomenon in a sajcple of monthly security
returns. Miller and Scholes (19B2) have argued that previous monthly studies
using American data, for exanple Lltzenberger and RaroaBvarc' (19T9, 19B2), were
contarinated try information effects and that their discover^' of a tax effect
vas therefore spurious. Monthly data are cf course subject to other biases,
and tnej' are noisier than the daily series. However, in Poterba and Summers
(ipBi+a), ve used monthly British data for the period 1955-Bl and again found
cTidence that tax changes induced movements in dividend valviation.23
The results in this section cast doubt on the veJLuc of the tax irre-
levance h^.-pcthesis in explaining vhy British firms pay dividends. Although it
is cf course possible that British and American institutions differ in vays
that preclude general^ning from the British erperience, this seems ur2.ii:ely.
Miller and Bcholes (1575), in their analysis cf the taxation of ciTidends in
the United Eta-es, 'suggested that the interaction "betveen v2.riou£ tax provi-
sions can cause dramatic reductions in the effective marginal tax rate on
capital income. They focussed on several devices" in the tax code vhich night
from en optimal trading strate^v'. ^
^^Some evidence of unusual return patterns around American ex-
days is reported in Elacl: and Scholes (19T3) and Eades, Eess and Kim (ipBii).
Mas (ipBii) presents corroborative evidence for the United Ilingdom.
--Countries besides the United ILingdom in vhich dividend tax
changes have taken place provide a valuable source of information on the divi-
dend question. Lai:onishol£ and Vermaelen (IPBS) provide some evidence that tne
r\a t-i ri ^ c Tnc5*-ir>e»^ r*or.—
.
reduce tne efJective diviaend ta>: rate: [i) the potential for divihend mcoine
to raise the liiiitation on interest income deductatillty ; (ii) tne availabi-
lity of life insurance policicB and single preiiiuE annuiticB as essentially
-tax-free accunulation vehicles; and (iii) the use of pension funds to allov
assets to earn the before-tax interest rate.^
While Bome of the relevant tax features appear in the British tax
code, others do not. Interest pajTuents are not deductible from taxable income
in the United Kingdos:, except in special circumstances involving hoiae mcrtga-
ges and several otber ninor cases. Moreover, there are strict (and c'-ite lov)
lisdts on the amount deductible. The first Miller-Scholes device is therefore
inaccessible to British investors. The life insurance nechanisE., however, nay
be more poverful as a tax avoidance device in Britain than in the United
States. Tax subsidies are provided for the pa:i,Tnent of insurance prenia, and
the proceeds cf the policies are generally' exerpt from capital gains. 25 Tiley
(15TB) observes that
"in recent years, these [insurance tax subsidies] have been
used to promote tax avoidance schemss ... tarpayers tooi:
advantage of the rules concerning relief from premiums to
buy shares or unit trusts vlth, in effect, the aid of en
exchequer subsidy, or higher rate taxTpayers put their assets
Eistent.vith the short—term trading hypothesis. Amoalru-Adu (19^3) and ITnoury
and Smith (19T7) proTide opposing e^'inence, however, shoving that share VEJ.ues
and dividend policies responded as predicted by the "veighted average of
investors ** nodal. Further vork remains to "t>e done on this ouestion.
S'+AlthDugh in principle all of these devices could generate
substantial tax sa^'ings for personal investors, the extent to vhich they are
actually used in the United States remains controversial. Feenberg (ipBl),
for exasrple,' showed that investors for vhom the interest deductability limita-
tion vas binding received only 2.5 tiercent of total dividend Da^TnentE in
19TT.
'
.
'
.
35a much more complete account of life insurance taxation is pro-
vided in Tiley (19TB), Chapter 3^. A related discussion of pension accum-jilation
;_ " nl
into funds vhere income could accunrulEtp virtut^liy free cf
tax tnankf to itax 1 conceeEions lor insurance
cospanies. ijj. i -. i i
'^inallj' vlth regard to pension fundE, the British and American Evstems are
Eindlar. Corporate contributlonE are deductible for corporate tax purposes,
and individual pension contributions are not treated as taxable income.
Pension funds are untaxed, and the earnings of pension funds are tax exenpt.
Vben pension income is received during retirement it is subjiect to ordinary
income taxation. As in the United States, the issue of vhetber marginal
investors are accusilating through these channels is unclear. Tnere nay be
other devices for sheltering income, available in the United Kingdom but not
in the United States, vhich we have failed to mention. Tnese vould only
strengthen our case sho^-ing that the potential for tax free accumulation is
clearly present in Britain. /'
^
Before presenting additional evidence to distinguish hetveen the tax
capitalization hypcthesis and traditicn£2 vie-.* cf dividend xaxes, ve turn in
the next section to an alternative methodologj' for stunying the i=pact of tax
changes on the sarket v£l.uaticn cf dividends. This vtJLl pro\'iQe further
information on vhether the Etoci: r£.ri:et exhicits a preference for dividends or
capital gsins.
TV. AFPf P": rf CnEr;.''«»r ett"' Iei^ Aj^ncj' »*»fT>e>.^* C
E>.-Qa3' evidence is only one vey cf trA-in£ to meaEure the effect cf
tax changes. Another involvcE the "event study" methodolon^' vhich is cften
used to investipate the effectB of regulatory reforms, mergerE, or other
financial nevs on corporate valuation. Bj' looting for changes in share priccB
vben najor tax reforms were announced or vhen expectations were otherwise
altered, we can derive further tectB for the influence of taxes on asset
valuation.
Using results in Section I, note that the vulue of a share, V
^ can
be vritten as the present value of the after-tax dividends its shareholderB
expect to receive:
[k.i] t' =. I I n (1 ^ A_ri]i6 r,'].
vbere p, is the aTter tax return reauired tn' the marginal investor in T>eriod •
t aad D is tiie dividend in period ^ paid to the ov^jers cf all currently
cutsterding shares. It rcliovs ir^iediatelv free (^.l) that isncring future
ecuitj issues, a periianest change in the dividend tax rate, throuji its effect
on £ , vill cause as equal proportional reduction in the value cf all firss.
This holds regardless, of the time path of their expected future dividends.
Ecwever equation (i;.l) makes it clear that a temorarr change in dividend
taxes vill impact differently on different firms. Ternsorary changes in divi-
dend taxes vill have their greatest inpact on firms wiich are expected to
distribute a large amount of dividend income in the immediate future. In the
extreme case of a firm that was not expected to pay enj' dii'idends for the
duration cf a tax change, the change would have no effect on market value.
-UC-
Ir, Tactice, tne TluidiTy cf ua>. policy leeveE Eoice ar:tifr>:lty ar to
vhether a particular policy is (i) tenporarv- and liKtl^- to 'De rpverBed, r- ( ii
)
•the first step in a program of escalatinc reforc. Tnese ^wo posnitllltieE
have diEtincllci'' different iinplicationE for the inpact of a tax increase on the
share values of different firms. If higher dividend taxes are expected to be
Ehort-lived, then Icjv yielding finnE vhich are valuable primarily because of
dividends projected to be paid in the distant fu^ure vill experience smaller
share rrice declines than high yielding firms vhich derive most of their vEJLue
from a high level of current dlridenoE. Alternatively, if the increase in
dividend taxes is viewed as the harbinger of still higher tax rates in the
future, then lov yielding firms vill decline "by mere than those vith high
yields, as the mariiet expects heavj' taxes nov, but even heavier taxes during
the time period vhen these firms finally distribute their profits.
Most cf the tax changes curing cur sample period vere clearly teiu-
pcrary. In 195B, viien the split-rate corriorate profits tax vas abolished and
replaced by e single rate tax vhich vas nich more favorable tovards dividend
payout, support for the measure came froa the Conservative rsjrzy. Labour vas
opposed, and the possibili-ty that the tax change vould "De reversed vhen "the
opposition gained control of Parliament vas recognized clearly. Indeed,
."that vas vhat happened. In 19^^, Labour von a narrov victory and promptly
announced a nev plan to raise taxes on capital income by adopting a corporation
income tax system vhich vould effectively "double-tax" dividend pa:iTnents.
Support for this policy again vas split clearly along party lines. Vhen the
Conservatives regained pover in 19T0, it vas not long before plans vere
announced (in the 1^71 fcudpet ) lor a return to ar, inLeprated xax Fyster vhich
vould Bubstantially reduce tne ^ax burden on dividends.
If dividend tax reforms are perceived as teinporarv- and the stock
market equates the value of each share vlth the present value of ItE after-tax
dividend Btreac, then increascE in the dividend tax rate should reduce the
value of tigh payout shares 'by a larger amount than low-payout shares. This may
be tested bj' relating the excess return on different firms during budget
announcement sonths to each fire's tj^pical dividend yield. Evidence that divi-
dend tax increases reduce the value of high-yield shares bj- more than they
reduce lov-yield share prices vould constitute strong evidence against the "tax
irrelevance" fajTsothesis.
lY.A Date and Methods
Dur studj' focuses on three events vhich substantially affected the
outlook for British dividend taxation. The^- are described belov:
Arril. l?5r Budget ST?eech: ChF.~cell.or Heathcoat Asicrj' announced
reforms in the prcfits tax, abcZjishing the differential 33/^ tax en distributed
profits and the 3% tax on undistributed earnings. Effective 1 April 1P5B
.(retroactively), he introduced a single-rate profits tax of 10 percent, "his
reform vas not fully
__
asticipated; The Econondst (IP April 195B) indicated that
Mr, Amory had shown ''"political courage" in adopting it. During April 195B, .
"the excess return on the -market , calculated as the total return on the
financial Times - Actuaries Share Index, rinus the Treasury 2ill rate, vas l.T
percent. Over the longer February to April period vhen expectations may have
been changing the excess market return vas 7.3 percent.
-If-
y.^y^^ v^^- _ no*"'.!. ".:--.-'^-.ir.P''t
:
After Labour ' f electoral ridCTs- in
n tobe" 19f^^» Cnancellor JameB Cullaphan announced Fweepinr j^lans for fiBcal
forci. -nese Included the svitch to a classical E^'Etem cf corporate income
taxation beginning in I966 and the inpocition of a capital painE tax beginning
in A~ril, 1965. The two proposalE should have had oppoEite effcctB on
dividend-paying firms. Introducing a capital gains tax should have raised the
value of (ii"\'idend Income, helping high payout firms. The svitch to a cor-
Doration tax E%'EteE hovever, and the repeal of the integrated tax EyBteo vhich
bad -Drevailed betveen 1955 and 19^^ , imposed a heavier tax burden on high
dividend firms than on high retentions corrpanies. This vas reflected in the
large change in 6 calculated in Section II. The general move toward heavier
taxation was recognized as one cause of the stock market's —^.T percent excess
return curing the month of Kovenber 195^*.
Mcrch. 1-Tl Budget ST>eecb: This was the first Budget speech after the
Couservative victor;.- of l^TC Chancellor Barber announced plans to end "the
substantial discrir.i nation in favour of retained as opposed to distri'cuted
prcfits" "r^- adopting a new E:.-ster cf corporation tax vhich vculd i=pute cor-
porate tax payments to sharehclders. The hudget also pronised substantial
reductions in the marginal tax rates applicable to investment income received trv' ""
personal investors, end should therefore have proved highly attractive for firms
vith currently high dividend payout. Tne excess return on the overall market
during March 1571 was 6.5 T>ercent.
To test for the effects of tax changes on different firms, we genera-
lized the monthly after-tax CAPM used 'Dy Gordon and Bradford (ipBO) and
I^oterba and Summers (ipBiia) to include terms vhich would canture the
_li_
e'"fectE cf budpet annour.cemer.ts. Tne eauatior. entimared war:
vhere d* is *^^ average dividend yield on a security during the previouE tventy-
«--„^ tnriT:*hf; and 1 iE an indicator variable vhich is set eaual to one If thelour ntJii-iio, ttiju V'lt
It-th observation correspondB to a month in the Tirst, second, or third "tax
regime." Tax Regime I iB defined to include observationE prior to the intro-
duction of a capital g£.inB tax in 1965- 1'b.x Regime 2 extendB from 1965 to
19T3, vhen the irrputation syEtec tool: effect, and Tax Regime 3 is the period
after April, 1973. This equation is a modified CAPK vhich takes account of
possibly differential valuation of diridends and capital gains, alloving for
changes vlieri major tax reforms occur. Poterba and Summers (l9Bi4a) estimate
several models of this tjTje and provide a f-j-JLer Justification for the specifi-
cation.
Tne critical vs-riables for cur present study are the last terms in
ecuatics (i.2). ' ^ is an indicator variable for the mcntiiE involving ma.*, cr
sit
tax refers, announcements, vhere s = ^/5B, ll/6i;, or 3/Tl. Tne coefficients
T_ and T.-_ caTture the effects cf tax announcements on Eecuritj' returns, vith
Tl^ reflecting differences viiich can "oe attributed to average dividend j'ield. -
If a "tax refers., say 'that in 1P5E, raised the value of higb-yield shares, then
ve vould predict that ti
-^o^E
'"^"'^^ "^ positive. The corresponding coef-
ficient for 1571 should also be positive, end it is difficult to predict the
sign of the 19^ announcements "Decau.se they involved changes in both dividend
and capital gains taxes.
The data set ve -used for our study is a sanple of over i;D,OOD
company-months of security returns, dravn from the London Business School
-5r.-
Share Price bata base. A EDre co=X;lcte oescriptior. cf this datE set may be
found in Poterba and Suraiers 119F"<fi).
The rcEultE of entimating equation (1..2) on this monthly date ert are
reported in Table 5. Vie show both the "n and n^ CDefficicntE in the table,
and Ehov resultE from several different definltionE of the "event period" during
^'hich information vas revealed. For exacple, the first row of the table
corresponds to a one-=onth event period. That is, I^^^ is equal to 1 only
during the month of the tax policy announcement. Eince expectations vere pro-
bably' evolving throughout the period immediately prior to the actual policy
announcement, in particular in election nonths as in 196^, ve also consider
Eomevhat longer event periods. Tvo- and four-month event T>eriod specifications
are also reported in Table 5. In '='"' cases, we define the event period as
ending in the announcement month. Many rreviouE studies cf ''even-s" end their
effects on share prices have suggesxed that the ms-riet cuichly adjsusts to nev
infcrmation, so alioving for ad^.ustment in the months af^er the budget speeches
seemed unnecessary'. So
The results' in T'able 5 proride some support for the viev that arrtici-
pated taxes are refl-ected in security prices. In 195E, firms vith high dlTidend
jields experienced substantially greater returns during the period around the
"budget speech than their ' lov-yield counterparts. A one percentage point
increase in a firm's di-ridend ydeld vould have induced a four percent higher
3'^he long tradition of c\'iDence for rapid market adjustment dates
to 7-am£. Tisber. Jensen, and Roll (I969).
1 Month
2 MsntiiB
yield
lax hei CTms and Enare Price Onanpes
J
:
19i>t j^i>~ Ar.nour.^eccrit
Duration cf Cnanpe m cf CapiLal Gams/ Announcement cf
P^p^^-. pe-- Qg Variable ^'-cf:TF lax Tr'-nr-at: o- lav
Constant -.019 -.002
(.016) (.005)
Months
Dividend k.9B2 .IBB
::ielQ t^.Elo) (1.1P3)
T .,!T:utct:or Svrt
-.017
(.007)
l.i466
(2.002)
Constant -.02l4 .001
(.028) (.010)
Dividend h.30U .030
!:ield (5.352) (3.3B1*)
Coniitant -C.DIO -C.006 -.0170
(.016) (.007) (.007^4)
Dividend l-.pBl 1.B60 1.1461^
Yield (3.B15) (l.Biil) (2.003)
-.DOB
(.005)
1.0142"
(1.351*)
Kctes: Coefficien-s ere estimated from the enuation:
* , «
^it-^ft-^i^^=t--rt^ = ^D " ^ir^^ist " ^^is •" ^2s'^it^=sit -^ ^it
using a data set of nonthly share retu-ms coroiled fron the London Business
School Share Price Da^^a Base. See Poxerha and Summers (l9Bi»a) for a more
derailed description cf this data set and the xext for further dezails on the
variahle definitions. Standard errors are rencrted in xiarentheses.
rev-rn curin£ the month cf Arril, ^^^,1. ZiZLilcrly , ir. ic-i, tnr ertimated
dividend yield coefficients are positive m £.11 estimated equationE,. Tnr}'
uceest that vhen conparing two firma, one vith e dividend yield one paint
hicher than the other, the high yield firm vould have earned a return about
one and one-half percentage pointa greater than that of the lov-yield finsi.
Unfortunately', none of the estimated coefficients is significantly different
.from zero at the 95 percent confidence level. This may in part reflect the
difficulticE of identifj'ing the times vhen nev infcrmation waE revealed, as
veil as the inherent isprecision associated vith the use of monthly data.
The ipol; budget speech had such veaker effects on the differential
returns between high and lov payout firms. The one- and four-month event
variables have tiny coefficients, and the Bomevhat larger 2-month variable,
vhich includes both the event month ,for the budget speech and the pre-i'iouE
month, wtien the election tooh place, has a larger coefficient but a t-statistic
ci^ly slightly greater than one. ^This event, as ve noted above, had effects on
both the t.ax treatment cf high and lov-payout shares. Under the assurn;tion that
capitial gains taxes vere paid at very lov effective rates, however, the reform
should have reduced the vtlue cf high-yield f:.ms. It rer.-.ins somsvhat
ETirprising that this effect does not leave a sitronger trace in the data.
._
.
One of the major difficulties" in ziry event Etun:^'- is identifj'ing the
times vhen information vas actually revealed xo marjiet participants. To the
extent that conditional upon electoral outcomes, budget proposals vere easy to
anticipate, the elections of 196i< and 19TD may have been the important ''events"
for the revaluation of different securities. Ve experimented vith these events,
as well as the actual budget speeches, in our errpirical vorh and again found
sm£^l revf^luatior. effects:, penert-lly in tne -prciizzei iirectionc, arour.i eler-
tion perioQB.
The weal: evidence in thiB section cor.rirmE the conclusion of the pre-
ceding section that changes in the tax rulcB facing typical investorE have
important effectE on the inarket valuation of dividends . Ab discuBsed at the
end of the last section, this conclusion is probablj' applicable to the U.S. as
veil B£ Britain. Ve therefore ere led to reelect the tax irrelevance viev as a
Bodel for analyzing the role of dividend taxes. In the next tvo sections, ve
exarine the tvo remcir-ing -vlcvs of the effects of dividend taxation.
The evidence presented in the last tvo sectionr. sugpentE tnct tiivi-
d nd tax cnangcB alter the Etocy. market 'e relative vuluation cf divioenQB and
ca-Dltal gains. 1* conBtitutes a partial refutation of the "tax irrelevance"
viev vhich argues that tax avoidance bj' individuals, coupled vith e>-day
trading by trokerE and institutionE, should eliriinate any tax-induced
valuation effectB* However, the finding that taxes Influence security returns
does not enable us to distinguish "Detveen the "tax capitalization" and the
"traditional" %'ievE of dividend taxation. Beth assume that dividend taxes are
capitalized into share prices and reflected in market returns. These tvo
vievs differ in their predictions about hov dividend tax changes vill affect
corporate financial and investment decisions. The tax capitalization viev
suggests that neither financial nor- real choices vill be influenced by a
reduction in dividend -axes, vhile the traditional i-iev predicts that both the
payout ratio and the level cf corporate investment vill respond to a tax
refers. In .the next tvo sections, ve examine the direct effects of postwar
British dividend tax changes, first on corporate dividend payout and then on
real investment decisions.
The tax capitalization viev derived corporate dividend payments as a
residual, the difference between current profits and the firm's investment
demands. Assuming that all investment could "oe financed from retained ear-
nings, ve showed in Section I that a permanent dividend tax reduction would
not affect the firm ' s - investment decisions. Funds for investment are already
inside the firm and therefore sub^lect to eventual dividend taxation. While a
.'^-.
Dermanent reduction in diviaend taxer ri-iper tne v^^lue cT tnese clcimr on
resources vlthin the corporate sector, It qocb not t-lxer tne ralet ior
investing these resourceE so as to maximize the flnr.'E vulue. Since divinend
taxation affectB neither invcBtment, the capital stock, nor current prcfitabi-
lity» it cannot have any effect on D = (j-t)!! - I. The tax irrelevance viev
BUggestB that changes in the investor tax preference ratio should have no
effect on corporate payout decisions. Discricinatcrj' corporate taxes,
hovever, could alter the level of dividend pajTnents, since they cannot be
la-andered tiy tax-conscious investors.
The traditional viev, "bj'- comparison, predicts that any permanent
change in the effective aarginal dividend tax rate vill affect corporate
payout decisions. Dividend policy is chosen ty balancing the marginal reduc-
tion in the firr's value due to- higher investor tax liabilities against the
aarginal increase in V2J.ue due to changes in the returr-, plD/d-t )II),
required by investors. A dividend tax reduction vill lower the cost cf
obtaining further reductions in "l
increase the firm's payout ratio.
The effects cf a ternjorar;" reduction in the dividend tax are
somevhat different." In the xax capitalization -viev, the cost of capital
depends on the expected change in the enuillbrium value of marginal d. Just
before an increase in the dividend tax, firms vill anticipate capital losses
from holding corporate capital, 'End vill reduce their investment activity. By
reducing
!___ but leaving H (K^ ) unchanged, such a change in investment activity
vould raise the observed dividend T)BVOut ratio of the comorate sector.
EiiLilarly, icmedist-cly prior tr e l:viaenri ta>. reauctior., fimr vould expect
to pain Eubstaritit.llj' Iroc tne upward revL.luation cf marginal q, and vould
therefore invest. This vould lead to e reduction in dividend pa>TnentB prior
-to a diTioend tax cut.
The trailtional "vIlcv also predicts changes in payout ratios as a
result of tenporary dividend tax reductions. However, temporary and pennanent
.changes vould cause the same proportionate reduction in dividend payout, Eince
the first order condition for optimal dividend choice, equation (I.17a),
neT5ends o::!^' on current values cf the tax parameters. This conclusion
depends critically upon the assur^tion that capital aiarket participants use
nr.ly the current -periog's dividend yield in choosing the appropriate discount
rate for the fire's earnings.
If instead investors chose p on the basis of the average dividend
yield for a few adjiacent periods, then the fire vould be a'ble to raise its
value "cy altering the tiring cf its dividend pa:.-aents. For example, if the
discount rate is detemined m' the value of (rD)/(I;l-t )I1) during a several-
quarter period, then "the fira could raise its dividend pa:,TnentE during the
less heavily taxed period, ccrpensating for this vith a reduction in dividend
payout curing higt—tax periods, and could raise its total value. !rh.is vould
induce svings in dividend policy around the introduction of tesporai^' dividend
tax changes', as veil as imen .permanent hut anticipated dividend taxes were
introduced. The tax irrelevance view predicts dividend re-ticing vhen the
corporate tax rules_ change, "Dut predicts no effect of personal tax reforms
.
"7.A Data and Methods
To test the payout predictions of the different ^-levs, we exardned
-Si~
*he a-Tepate peyout Dennvicr c: tri-oair'F inaur,trii._ En- ^omnercia.
"onpanies. The tectE reported in thir. Bection er^-loy seaEonally unad^ucted
data on prosE dividend pa^inentE and corporate prcflts. we crav heavilj- on
Poterba (l9Bl4a), vhere the data are Qescribed in greater detail. In the
United StatcB, the iividend payout ratio is defined as the ratio of dividend
paymentB, before personal tax, to corporate profits after corporate tax. In
S-ixain, this definition is nisleading because corporate taxes, hence after-
tax T:rcfitE, depend upon the fire's payout pclicj' vhen a non-tlasEical cor-
Dorate tax syEtCE is in effect. The di'.'ldend payout concept vt.ich ve enrploy
is the ratio of gross dividends paid to the imxirrur feESlLle rross dividends
of the firE..37 Ttis definition ensures that movements in the payout ratio
measure cnanges in the fraction of their dividend paying capacity vhich firms
are using, and not changes in the corporate tax treatment of dividends. Under
a tax E^'Ster. lijce that in the U.E., it is equivalent to the standard measure
of the payout ratio.
—xtlicit dividend ccztrcls vere in force for ri:cb of the IJTDs, and
they substartialiy reduced the gross dividends paid m- the Industrial and
investigation cf the relationship between dividends, profits, and the tax
code. To avoid these -difficulties, ve report regression results for tvo
•^'This is one of the dividend payout concepts suggested 'oy
Teldstein (1970).
S^Evidence in Poterba (ipBi+a) suggests as much as a fifty percent
reduction in desired dividends.
separate time periods. Tne firct. lo-._:c-2, i, ^nc- tc tne introduction cf
diviaend controls. Tne second sarple period InLluoer tne prt-contrcl period
as well B.S data for ipBO-lpB^, the period after the diviaend controlE had been
lifted. In using data for I9BO-B3 we allow for the possibility of structural
change in the payout relation ty adding a dumD^j"- for the post I9B0 period.
The equation that we estimate is:
t D 1 t-1 £: t—^ s> * ^ t-1 t
E^logtY , /y ) -^ E^loge + Epilogs + E^Lloge + u
5 t—M t 5 t Ci t+1 ( t t
vbere D denotes gross dividends, Y equals maxiEum feasible dividends, and 6 is
the total tax preference ratio. Lagged di^'iQend and profit terms are included
to allow for flexible adjustment c:\'nai2icE toward the new steadj' state. The
estimated equations also include seasonal dusn^ •variables. The equation was
estimated both 'vy CIS and vith a maxirmr llKelihood correction for second-
crder serial correlation; the results were act particularly sensitive to the
specification cf the disturbance ter:::.
T.3 Results
demonstrate the irnscrtance cf diridend taxes in determining the eirtent to
vhicb' firms rtilize their diTidend-pay^ing capacity. Equations estimated
vlthcnit any allowance for short-run adjustments in dividend policy around tea
changes suggest long run divid'end payout elasticities vith respect to the
total tax preference ratio of between 2.6 and l.B, depending on the specifica-
tion and time period chosen. There is also evidence that tax policy' chances
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'nduce shcrt-ran ad.luEtmer.tF in diviaerd pavout. Ar ar.tici-Dcted ten percent
increase in the tax preference ratic, ccrresponiinc to rouphl:.- b four percent
reduction in the shareholder tax rate on diviaendB, cauBCB dividends to fall
toy eight percent of their planned value in the quarter inmediately prior to
the tax reform. Moreover, there is a Eomevhat Emaller transitory increase in
the level of dii'idend payments immediately after a tax change is instituted.
ControH-ing for Ehort-tera adJiusrinentE in payout policy alters the estimated
Eteady-state effects of a dividend tax change. The long-run elasticity of
diridend payout vith respect to the tax preference ratio declines to between
1.03 and 2.05 in the dividend equations vhich incorporate changes in the tax
rates.
The dividend equations estimated for the earlj' sasple period,
1955-72, j-ield plausible vaiues of the elasticity' cf dividends vith respect to
profits. They indicate a long-run elasticity' cf gross dividends vitb respect
~o aaxiTzsi feasible dividends cf be^veen .5 ssii .E, and the h^.'pctbeEis that
this elasticitj' is ^iiiity eaa never "oe rejected. Less plausible results emerge
from the regression models viiicb include post-ipBO data. Estimates of the
long-run TTFy'r^^r dividend elasticity' are substantially lover than "those for
the earlier sa=ple, and negative estimates are obtained in tvo cf the four
reported equations. The hsTJCthesis that this elasticity is unitj' still cannot
be rejected, however, in either cf the equations vhicb vere estimated vith an
AE2 error structure. Poterba (l9Bita) suggests that the lov maximum dividend
elasticities are probably due to divergences between accounting profits and
real profits at the end of the sarrole period. Accounting profits are used in
_^c_
the constrjction cf maxiiLur: leariiLle divioenar,
.
Tne evidence on dividend payout and tax policy repcrxed above did
not distinguish betveen chanpes in the investor tax preference ratio and tne
effect of var^'ing corporate tax J^tes on retained and distributed earnings.
The tax capitalization and traditional %'iew predict that changes in either of
these tax paraneters should affect dividend payout, vhlle the "tax
irrelevance" viev suggests that only corporate tax changes should affect divi-
dendB. Poterba (ipB^a) tests the hj'pcthesis that investor tax preference
changes affect dividend payout. Although the effect cf corporate tax changes
can be estimated core precisely"- than investor tax effects, both trj-pes of tax
reforms influence corporate di%'lQend deciEions. Tiiis provides further cri~
dence against the tax irrelevance hj-potheEis, as well as the capitalization
view, and buttresses the traditional viev- of dividend taxation.
The British time-series data is not the or-lj' source of variation in
dividend tax rates. -° American dividend taxes vere substantially lower "oefore
"world war n, and particularIj' before I?32, than in subsequent years. Brittain
(19^5) and roterba and Burners (l9Bi;b) document that changes in weighted
average marginal t^a raxes on dividends in tne Z.S. nave a significant i=pact
on corporate dividend policies. rrit-E^n (1960) concluded that ''rising indi-
.
vidual tax rates jbetween 1920 and 19^0 ] were found to depress dividends.
Most estimates showed ithey] -were suTficient to account for the pronounced
downward trend in payout, that which occurred "oetween the late 1920e and the
early postwar period. 1^.190]" Tnis finding provides further e^'idence in
-5a number of studies have demonstrated that British tax reforms
have influenced -DEvou-t TJolicj^. Tnese include Feldsxein (IPTO), King (1971,
19TT), and Fane '(19T5)."
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*avor cf tne traditional vipv of diviaend taxes. Ir Vcteroa end Eurnirrp
(lOBijb), ve arpue tnat tne failure cf divioend payout ratios to rise over tne
past 15 years is strong evidence against Miller and Scholes ' (19TE, 10^2) cla
that tbe U.S. income tax has evolved towards a consunption tax.
t A • - ^ - " —
Tne evidence m tne lact eection focuped on the direct linkapes bet-
veen tax rates and dividend payout. One of tne principal nctlvationB for our
interest in dividend taxes, however, was their possible impact on corporate
irvestment deciEionB. In this section ve Bunmarize the rcEults of Poterba and
SunmerB (1983) on the relationship between "Tohin'E q" and the invectment behB-
rior of British firms. This tilowe ue to obtain further evidence on the dif-
ference 'tietween the traditional and the tax capittlization %'iewB.
These two views predict different steady state vtlues of the narxet
value of corporate equity divided tiy its replacement cost. Because the level
of investment activity can be shown to depend upon the difference between the
current value of c and its steady state level, the two views j'ield different
specificEtions for the investment function.
In Section I, we derived the vsJlue cf m2.rgin£l c predicted bj' the
tax eapi~F.1 '. zation viev. Under a classical corporate tax revise siru-lar to
that prevailing in the united Etates, c = (lL-a)/(ll-t ). Managers asi 'vill
"this project rsise share values 'oy els rucb as it reduces the after-tax divi-
dend income cf sharehclderE " and tbey undertake some investment TrcjectE which
do not raise the firm's vslue 'oy the project's ^ull cost. In eguilibriur.,
therefore, the market vsl.ue of the firm vill equal (l-a)/(l-i) times the repla-
cement value of the firm's assets. In contrast, xmder the traditional viev,
the egu.libri-um value cf marginal q is eIwevs unitj-. If marginal and
average q are equal, ^^ the total value of the firm vill therefore equal the
full re-Dlacement cost of its ca-aital in tlace.
^^ayashi (1982) presents the formal conditions for equality bet-
veen the average and marginal values of c.
Ae argued tr\- KrrneE ;i936) end 1'otin [Z<^('9), and ,1uctlfied :crmi.l]y
in the context cf an ad^luctment cost mooel ir,' hnyashi (IQSZ) and Summers
(19BI), the level of investment vlll depend on the deviation of Tobin'E q from
itB eq;iilibrium value, q . ThuE , it ie natural to postulate that:
(£.1) i-^^pr-'i^^
vhere V/pII is the ratio of the saarket value of a fire to its replacement
cost, or "I'ocin's c." Eince alternative vievs about dividend taxcE have dif-
ferent inplicationE for the level cf c^, 'ir,' comparing alternative specifiCB-
tions of q^ in (6.1 ) ve can in principle distinguish these •N'ievE.
Before fuming xo the esrpirical estinateB, one additional complication
remains. Oiir discussion bo far has. ignored debt finance and corporate taxes.
In Poterba and Surmers (19B3) ve shov bov •these considerations ir.fluence c under
the alternative investment models. Ir particular, ve shov that the
appropriate investment functions under the two Tievs are:
(£.2) i^'^J^sAD^ " -^St"'"*^ ^^- -^z^^-"^^!
and
(£.3). i= r(c^J '.= fKlilrSl^^ ^-b. i)/(-0}
trtiere n is the present value of all depreciation allowances and investment
incentives on a one pound investment, °r is the corporate tax rate on retained
earnings, b is the fraction of investment financed vith debt, and B is the pre-
sent value of remaining depreciation allowances on existing capital. Tne only
.6\.
i-fference oezveer. tne x,vo equEtionr if tnct t.ne tax capl*„£_li::atior, t'^.TiclhrziF
inplicE the presence of a terri l/t r:u.ltiplyin£ the marKet vi^lue cf equity,
correcting for the effectB of tax capitalization in affecting the rirr.'E
inveEtnent decisions.
The investment modelB vhich we estimate take the simple form
and
t
These specifications are derived and explained in greater detail in Poterba and
SunmerB (19B3)» vbere the t^ is interpreted as a random Ehock to the cost-of-
adjustaent function. The appeal of- the "c" investment approach is that vhile
ether approaches to estimating the investment ispact of personal taxes require
TIE to specify the fire's cost cf capital, the ''c" fcrmlation does not. Eince
the investor's discount rate P enterE the cost cf capital and is unoDservahle,
efforts to define the cost cf capital are prone to error.
Our first tests cf the "Wo rievs are based en ccrparisons cf the fit
cf {6.k) and {6.5)- Because all firms ss.j not be on the Eame luarpin, the aggre-
gate investment function night be a veighted average cf the capitalisation and
the traditional investment functions. In order to allov for this possibility
ve also specified en investment equation vith a veight cf o en (£.5) and (1-d)
on (c.it). This veighted' average investment equation takes the form
, {c + (i_o)^i.^ -H b + u - 1
(£.6) ^= E *(E, f E.L)( rS^ ) ^ s
-6--
vhere L if *ne la£ operator. Tne tradit.iont.2 v^ev cf tne diviaend tax is
Eupucrxed tn' estimates of 6 near unity. If, hovever 6 ie close to zero, tnen
tax capitalization vould appear to be the more appropriate model for investment
declBions.
To estimate these models, we used annual data on the Industrial
and Cosmercial ConpanicB in Great Britain for the period 195C>-19B0. Our invest-
ment variable, I/Il, is the gross investment rate for these cospanies. The
values of Srrp.'n ^^^ »^p vere constructed using financial mcrket data provided try
the Bani: of England. Tax rates vere measured using the weighted average
marginal tax rates vhich were described in Section II.
Yl.B Results
The results cf estimating investment models vith both sets of Q
variables are shovn in Table 7. They are based on re-vised data and
therefore differ (triviaZJLy) fros earlier findings ir. Pcterbe and Eursers
(19-3). Tne findings demonstrate the superiority cf the Q specification based
on "the "traditional viev" cf dividend taxatio::. In each regression pp, * r , the
v_, ecuatioi: fits better tha:: the ^„ specificatio::. Ir addition., the ^r^j^
models suggest a larger effect cf 5 en investasnt activity. These results
faToring the traditional model are buttressed 'by ether specifications reported
in Poterba and Summers (19B3).
The most direct test^ of the two models comes from estimating the
veighting parameter in (6.6). The point estimates for this equation are shown
below:
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The hj'pothesiE that = 1 cannot be reelected at standard Elgnificance Itvels,
BUggesting that we cannot reject the traditional ^'lev•'E investment equation.
The point bj'pothesiE that o = 0, corresponding to tax capitalization ^-lev, is
however decisively rejected tiy the investment data. It appears that the bulk
of investnent decisicns are nade tyy corporations who act es_ _if_ marginal
investaent is financed through nev share issues.
Tills finding confirms the analysis in the preceding section'
suggesting that the traditional riev of dlTidend taxes is most consistent vith
the British experience. It does not appear that firms lower their investment
thresholds when they can finance investment out of retained earnings as
suggested "rr.- the tax capi-aI±zation hypothesis.
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Our empirical testB ucinc oata on pecurlty returns, poyout t)enavicr,
and investment deciEionE all point to e common conclusion. Tne traditional
viev of dlrioend taxes, vhich repardE them as an additional corporate tax bur-
den proridcB the best approximation to their effectB. We are led to re.^ect
nodelB of the economic effectB of dividend taxes vhich Buggest that dividend
xiajTnentE have no adverse tax conseaucnceE, as veil aE those vhich argue that
firms pay dividenas because money is "trapped" vithin the corporate sector.
Viiile these concluEions are "oased on British data, cur comparison of the tax
lavs ir. Britain and the Ur-ited States suggests that thrj' are liicely to be
applicable in the American context as vell.^1
Our resultE have inrportant irrplicationE for tax policy as veil as
dividend policy and valuation. They icply that the t.Dtal tax burden on cor-
porate income includes both corporate taxes and dividend and capital gains
taxes levied 02 corporate sharebolders. In a2 econcrdcally meariingful sense,
dividends are double-taxed. A reduction in dividend t;ax rates vould increase
dividend Tseyout and corporate investment, and lover firms' cost of capital.*'
2
A. further i=tlicaticn cf these results is that estimates cf the total
lOm- analysis is corroborated by the vort of Long (197B) and
Poterba (198i»b) on the valuation of securities issued by tbe Citizens
Utilities Coarpanj'. r>ue to a ouirk in tbe tax lav this conroai^r vas alloved toissue both shares vith taxable and nontaxable dividends. Long (197B) shovsthat the taxable securities sell for more than the nontaxable securities.
Poterba (IpBitb) shovs using ex-day evidence that aarginal investors in taxableShares appear to be taxed. These facts can only be reconciled in terms of adividend preference model, illicitly the traditional viev.
'^This suggests an important difficulty vith manj' previous stu-dies of investment behavior. Most of the econometric studies troceeding vithin
ohe flexible accelerator framevork pioneered bj- Jorgenson (1963) and Hall andJorgenson [196?; has ignored the role of personal tax variables. While this
omission may not be too important for the United States, vhere tax rates on
Jr.
tax b'jraen on corporate CEtitt.1 income vhich ass-jirie tnat i:viaer,c taxe? do not
have a marginal inpact on retentions- financed inventreent , cuch as the cuIcuIh-
tions in Auerbach (lQ?3c) and King and Fullerton (IQBI^), cipr.lficantly
understate the tax burden on corporate income. EstimatcE such as those
reported "ny Jorgenson and Sullivan (19B3) and Hulten and Vykcfr (19?3), vhich
ignore dividend taxation entirely', are ciiailarly flawed. Tne empirical
oucEtion of vhich dividend tax rate to use in calculating effective corporate
tax rates is ilfficult to answer vith anj' precision. Horwever, our findings in
Section HI suggest that the weighted average approach used bj- King(l?TT/,
Feldstein and Suinmers (19T9), and Feldstein, Dicks-Mireaux, and Poterba (19P3)
may be satisfactcrT,'. Taking this approach renders invalid the frequently-
quoted conclusion that the United States no longer taxes corporate investment
income. -,.^
Dur results also suggest that measures directed at providing dividend
tax reZJ-ef vould reduce the inefficiencies associated vith the doutle taxation
cf ccrpcrate capital income. These inefficiencies include distortions in the
aZJLccation cf capital between ccrpcrate and nonccrpcrate uses, distortions in
the choice "netveer present and future consunpticn, distortions in ccrpcrate
financial policy', 2 eji6. distcrtions in the allccation cf risl: "oearing. In cor>-
sidering the merits of dividend tax relief, however, it is necessary to veigh
these efficiency pains against the equity effects and the efficiency costs of
Eharehclders have evolved slovly over time, it is potentially critical for
modelLling investment in Britain or ether nations in •rai.ch radical tax changes
have taker place. •
•^E;stiaE.tes of the intersectcral distortions due to capital
income taxation are found in Harberger (1962 ) and Fullerton, ctal. (198I).
For evidence on distortions in interteCTora.1 choices, see Feldstein (197B) and
-6F^
alxernative rpvenue sources.
Killer and Scholes (1976) Erpje that tne failure cf the bucinesr con-
siunlTy to Etronfl:.' support Carter adnir.iEtration propoBals callinc for diviaend
tax relief constituteE evidence that dividend taxes are not burdensome. We
vould suggest the alternative hj-pothesiE that this failure is attributable to
the same agency problcas vhicb lead Ehareholders to require dividend pajinentE
in the first instance. Dividend pa^^ne^tE are the sharehclders ' vay of nonl-
toring managerB. Vnen di^'idend taxcE are reduced, Ehareholders find monitoring
cbea-oer and do more of it. The failure cf corporate managerB to lobby for
dividend relief reflects their oeciEion to lobbj' for their own rather than
their Eharebolder'E interest. An alternative possibility is that managers sav
dividend relief as an alternative to even more attractive forms of corporate
tax reduction.
^
Cmr onalysiE has abstracted fron two iirpcrtant espectE cf reality',
clientele effects and fims ' iise cf debt finance. lieither cf these abstrac-
tions accounts for c-^r qualitative conclusions. I^'idence presented 'oy Bluse,
Crockett, and Friend (197^) and Levellen, et. al. (19TB) suggests that clien-
tele effects ore net large. Clienteles =ight attenuate the "burden cf dividend
.
taxes, tut vould net elirdnate it unless taxpaying investors held onl^' zero
dividend stocks. The data clearly reelect this possibility'. Vith respect to
debit finance, it vould be Etraightforvord to append to azr fonailation of the
firm's decision problem either a "Miller model," as in Miller (19TT), or a
debt-capacity model (as in Gordon and Malkiel (ipBl)) in' vhicb bankrupty risk
lajsited debt-equity ratios. Neither atnroach vould alter cur conclTisions.
.Aw_
KonethelesE, It.vould be VL-lucLle tr En£-2v:e tn* effectF cf diviaend ^axE.t.ion i:
a richer model than the one we have preBcr.'.ed here.
Our findings sugpcEt the inricrtance cC providing both a theoreticL.1
motivation for, and empirical measures of, the inveEtore' "dividend preference
function." Theoretical explanationE might be further developed along the
lines of the incentive signalling approach to corporate finance. Vhile
models explaining vhj' dividends are paid have been Buggested, thiE vork has not
yet reached the point of generating empirically falsifiable predictions about
the effects of vai^'ing dividend yields, either acrosE time or across firms, on
required returns.
The most prosising direction for empirical research appears to
involve examining the effects of dividend yield on the required return of
dividend paj'ing firms, during periods vhen diiT-dends are not paid.''*^ The
extent to vhich it is appropriate to control for risk in such a calculation is
•unclear,' since iiigher 7,"leldE may reduce required returns precisely' "Decause
they reduce risk. *we are currently pursuing research along these lines.
riton, C-ruber, and Rent::ler (19^3) report some investigations
along these lines.
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